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LEGISLATIVE UNDERWRITES
Ethan J. Leib & James J. Brudney*
This Article introduces a widespread but virtually unacknowledged
practice in Congress and state legislatures. Not only do legislatures
override judicial decisions when they disagree with judicial rulings and
doctrine, they also underwrite judicial decisions when they agree with
those rulings. For all the literature on the adversarial communication
evidenced through legislative overriding, there is not a single paper
devoted to legislative underwrites, which reflect more collaborative
dimensions of interbranch interaction. This Article begins to fill that
void, and in so doing, frames practical and theoretical lessons for
legislative, judicial, and scholarly audiences.
More specifically, this Article defines the contours of an underwrite
and identifies the diversity of underwrite initiatives in Congress and
state legislatures. It then normatively evaluates costs and benefits that
might flow from a more self-conscious approach to underwrites,
analyzing these pros and cons as they operate at pragmatic, doctrinal,
and conceptual levels.
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INTRODUCTION
L EGISLATIVE overrides occur when a legislative body tells a court
that its interpretation of statutory product is wrong for one reason or
another.1 What we call "legislative underwrites" occur when a
legislative body gives the judiciary a "hear, hear!" signaling that its
interpretation is right. We aim in this Article to introduce and describe
the previously overlooked frequency of the corollary to overrides and to
evaluate this seemingly recurrent practice and its doctrinal
1 Consider the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat.
2076, 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)), or the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 101, 104 Stat. 978, 978 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 621 note (2012)). Through these acts, Congress announced that the Supreme Court
was wrong in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), and Public Employees
Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989), respectively. See H.R. Rep. No.
95-948, at 2-3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4750-51 (explaining Act's
purpose to override Gilbert); S. Rep. No. 101-263, at 5 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1510; H.R. Rep. No. 101-664, at 6 (1990). Consider also a 2013
amendment to Kansas's Restraint of Trade Act, S. 124, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2013),
which overrode the 2012 Kansas Supreme Court decision in O'Brien v. Leegin Creative
Leather Products, 277 P.3d 1062 (Kan. 2012).
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consequences. Scholars commonly model the interaction of the branches
as a kind of dialogue,2 but that dialogue is too often seen only through its
adversarial lens and not through the more collaborative lens we expose
here.
At both the federal and state levels, there are moments of interaction
between the branches in which the legislature reminds the judiciary who
is boss in matters of statutory interpretation. Generally speaking, this
give and take over statutory meaning among legislatures and courts is
healthy and necessary for the field of statutory interpretation. Applying
traditional constitutional conceptions of legislative supremacy, in which
a court's role is to serve as a faithful agent in statutory decisions,3 such
exchange between lawmakers and law interpreters is an essential
element in developing effective and democratic policy over time.4
Whether a legislature enacting an override seeks to restore an earlier
understanding of a statute with its pronouncement, or instead makes a
prospective policy intervention that effectively abandons a prior judicial
decision, such moments of interbranch engagement can serve to
calibrate statutory law more carefully at the federal or state levels.
2 See generally Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I,
65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 917 (2013) ("[M]uch interpretive theory and doctrine depends" upon
"interpretive dialogue between courts and Congress."). Although for the purposes of this
Article, we presume that different forms of interbranch dialogue help structure the theory
and practice of statutory interpretation, a forthcoming paper on interbranch dialogue will
deliver a more careful analysis of just what it means for institutions to be talking to one
another and a more calibrated defense of the use of this trope. See James J. Brudney & Ethan
J. Leib, "Interbranch Dialogue" in Statutory Interpretation (forthcoming 2018).
3 See generally Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of
Judging, 101 Calif. L. Rev. 699, 748 (2013) (explaining the conventional view that, in
statutory interpretation cases, the judiciary is supposed to be a faithful agent of the
legislature); Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent, Integrative, and Welfarist Interpretation, 14
Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1565, 1566-70 (2010) (summarizing the agency view).
4 There is some disagreement among Supreme Court Justices about whether the dialogue
always takes place in good faith. See generally W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83,
113, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("On those occasions ... when the Court has put on
its thick grammarian's spectacles and ignored the available evidence of congressional
purpose and the teaching of prior cases construing a statute, the congressional response has
been dramatically different.... In the domain of statutory interpretation, Congress is the
master. It obviously has the power to correct our mistakes, but we do the country a disservice
when we needlessly ignore persuasive evidence of Congress' actual purpose and require it
'to take the time to revisit the matter."' (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1031
(1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting))). For Justice Stevens, overrides are sometimes little more
than rebukes to the courts and, therefore, a waste of legislative energy.
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The law review literature is replete with commentaries that explore
the practice of overriding, usually on the federal stage.5 Scholarly
writing focuses on conceptual, typological, doctrinal, and empirical
work. Of late, this has included developing insight into how to identify
conscious or unconscious legislative overrides.6 Judges, too, focus on
the possibility for overrides: majority or dissenting Justices more than
occasionally invite Congress to override a statutory decision with which
they take issue.
7
This Article, by contrast, examines the conditions and justifications
for when legislatures do or should underwrite the textual meaning a
court confers upon a statute. We do so for several reasons. First, we wish
to encourage greater awareness among legislators, judges, and scholars
as to the frequency with which legislatures engage courts in this
nonadversarial fashion. Second, we hope to promote doctrinal clarity,
inasmuch as recognizing the presence of underwrites has implications,
for example, for the weight to be given to statutory stare decisis and
legislative inaction. And finally, we want to suggest ways underwrites
5 See, e.g., James Buatti & Richard L. Hasen, Response: Conscious Congressional
Overriding of the Supreme Court, Gridlock, and Partisan Politics, 93 Tex. L. Rev. See Also
263 (2015); Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides
of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 1317
(2014); Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court,
and Congress, 86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 205 (2013); Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining
Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 Tex. L. Rev.
859 (2012) [hereinafter Widiss, Hydra Problem]; Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents
and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 511 (2009) [hereinafter Widiss, Shadow Precedents]; Pablo T. Spiller &
Emerson H. Tiller, Invitations to Override: Congressional Reversals of Supreme Court
Decisions, 16 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 503 (1996); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale L.J. 331 (1991); Beth Henschen,
Statutory Interpretations of the Supreme Court: Congressional Response, 11 Am. Pol. Q. 441
(1983).
6 James Buatti and Professor Richard Hasen, for example, argue that it makes sense to
ignore "unconscious overrides" in the descriptive analysis of trying to figure out when they
occur because only "conscious" overriding shows meaningful legislative-judicial dialogue in
our practices of statutory interpretation. See Buatti & Hasen, supra note 5, at 264-65.
7See, e.g., Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 594 (1989) (majority opinion inviting
Congress to consider an override); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618,
661 (2007) (same, in a dissenting opinion). See generally Lori Hausegger & Lawrence
Baum, Inviting Congressional Action: A Study of Supreme Court Motivations in Statutory
Interpretation, 43 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 162 (1999) (describing and analyzing forty-two invitations
to override among Supreme Court majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in the 1986-
90 Terms).
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enhance a legislature's authority and legitimacy, such as by foreclosing
continued uncertainties in the courts or resistance from agencies
regarding the meaning of statutes.
We define a legislative underwrite as action that evidences an express
legislative endorsement of a judicial reading of a statute-either by
altering or amending statutory text or by being explicit in reliable
legislative history accompanying such a statutory amendment. An
underwrite is not merely a concurring citation or a summary affirmance;
it includes a clear indication of substantive agreement with a specific
court decision or an articulated dimension thereof.
We recognize at the outset some possibility of confusion with the
term "underwrite" as it is used in the insurance or other commercial
context. But we employ the term both because it serves as a textual
complement to "override" and because the analogy to insurance captures
a useful aspect of our approach. Just as an insurance underwriter accepts
liability or responsibility in its policy, thereby guaranteeing payment, so
in our setting can a legislature endorse and accept responsibility for a
court's statutory decision and analysis, effectively guaranteeing its
legitimacy. Indeed, this guarantee may result in a form of
"supercharged" precedent in certain institutional settings. Imagine
Congress embracing a court decision that serves to foreclose agency
intransigence under a new administration, or Congress underwriting a
lower court decision that serves to preempt or resolve circuit court
conflicts. At the same time, a legislature's summary approval of an
identified court decision, rather than its rewriting policy from the ground
up, can sometimes be a strategic act-a form of accountability occlusion
by using a court's authority to overshadow its own. Even then, however,
we classify it as an underwriting as long as there is meaningful
engagement with the relevant judicial decision.
Apart from the choice of terminology,8 there are questions about the
scope of our underwrite definition. One could envision the range of
8 One might refer to this kind of legislative endorsement as a "codification" or
"ratification." But those familiar terms strike us as incomplete. As we will explain, an
underwrite involves some degree of elaboration or explanation accompanying approval in
the textual adjustment, the legislative history, or both. Accordingly, a sub silentio or
unconscious codification or ratification would not amount to an underwrite without a sign of
express engagement with the decision purportedly being endorsed. Conversely, a
codification may not be necessary if authoritative legislative commentary embraces a court's
decision as reflective of current text. In addition, "codification" and "ratification" are more
2017] 1491
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underwrites more broadly to include statutory endorsements of agency
interpretations or to encompass subsequent legislative history "in the
air" that attempts to ratify a court decision without being tethered to the
process of making, revising, or repealing law that culminates in
enactment. Or one could understand underwrites more narrowly to
exclude any statements in legislative history. But for the purposes of
introducing the category and gaining some analytical and normative
traction on it, we draw the metes and bounds of underwrites to focus on
explicit enactments or express pronouncements in suitably reliable
legislative history. By defining underwrites to require such deliberate
and deliberative endorsement of judicial decisions, we remain mindful
of the ongoing debate (much of it critical) about the use of legislative
inaction as a form of acquiescence that is relevant to courts doing
statutory interpretation. 9
One earlier study found that legislative codifications of statutory
decisions occur routinely within the tax area. ° Other scholars have
noted in passing that overrides are sometimes accompanied by partial
agreement with court decisions, though without much commentary on
how to approach, conceptually or doctrinally, these statements of
agreement.11 In general, however, scholarly attention has focused far
more on overrides, 12 with an unstated assumption that underwrites occur
likely to be used in connection with a legislature's adoption of common law decisions rather
than statutory ones, a distinction we will elaborate upon below.
9 For scholarly skepticism about judicial use of legislative inaction, see, for example,
Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 422,
427 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 67,
69-70 (1988); Robert J. Gregory, The Clearly Expressed Intent and the Doctrine of
Congressional Acquiescence, 60 UMKC L. Rev. 27, 29 (1991); Anita S. Krishnakumar,
Longstanding Agency Interpretations, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 1823, 1846 (2015); Earl Maltz,
The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 367, 390 (1988). For a defense of such use in
particular circumstances, see James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial
Interpretation of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 75-94
(1994). We return to this issue in our discussion in Part III.
10 See Nancy C. Staudt, Ren6 Lindsttidt & Jason O'Connor, Judicial Decisions as
Legislation: Congressional Oversight of Supreme Court Tax Cases, 1954-2005, 82 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1340, 1386-88 (2007).
1 See Widiss, Hydra Problem, supra note 5, at 860 (discussing Congress's "partial
codification and partial override of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins[, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)]");
Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1325, 1358-59 (referencing "codifications").
12 See Staudt et al., supra note 10, at 1343 ("[T]he extant literature on Congress-Court
relations tends to focus exclusively on congressional overrides.").
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much less often than their contrarian legislative cousins. Whether that
assumption is empirically correct is less important than bringing into
view underwrite practices that are occurring without most legal scholars
or judges noticing them. And without notice, judges will fail to integrate
these underwrites into doctrines of statutory interpretation that they
clearly implicate-most notably statutory stare decisis and other
doctrines surrounding legislative silence.
In Part I, we introduce the analytical category of legislative
underwrites, highlighting certain archetypal approaches in both federal
and state legal systems. In establishing the diversity and frequency of
underwrites, we anticipate and deflect any scholarly inference that such
legislative approval practices are marginal to interbranch interactions.13
We also address certain complicating aspects of this exchange that make
the underwrite category more than a binary one.
In Part II, we furnish our most direct normative analysis of legislative
underwrites. In examining possible costs and benefits, we consider
reasons disfavoring and favoring the practice that operate on pragmatic,
doctrinal, and jurisprudential levels. We also discuss certain
vulnerabilities that may limit the scope and meaning of underwrites as
applied by "downstream" statutory interpreters. While sensitive to the
costs and vulnerabilities, we ultimately defend a coherentist perspective,
which tends to support underwriting's contribution to policy
development that is cooperative and rational, thereby enhancing its
legitimacy.
14
Finally, in Part III, we discuss the interplay between underwrites and
key interpretive doctrines that invoke legislative silence, specifically
statutory stare decisis and the reenactment rule. In addition, we offer
preliminary thoughts on certain settings in which underwrites may be
13 See Henschen, supra note 5, at 444 (finding that, of 176 bills introduced in Congress
between 1950 and 1978 reacting to Supreme Court labor and antitrust decisions during this
period, eleven percent were designed to enact or supplement a Court decision, whereas
eighty-nine percent were designed to reverse or modify a decision). The ratio of bills
introduced is of course not equivalent to the ratio of bills that became law. Still, Professor
Henschen's findings from an earlier period suggest that lack of scholarly attention to
underwrites may be in part grounded on empirical assumptions, ones we do not attempt to
evaluate here.
14 This is a core feature of "The Legal Process." See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M.
Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 2031, 2042-45 (1994).
2017] 1493
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especially valuable. Even if a reader ends up weighing the costs and
benefits differently than we do, the analysis in Part II will have
important implications for how to approach the doctrines we discuss in
Part III. We close the Part by identifying several institutional
mechanisms at the federal level that might make underwrites more
salient in ongoing interbranch exchanges. We conclude that, when
underwrites are done well, bringing them to light is generally good for
the rule of law and legal development.
Ultimately, we hope to illuminate for legislators, judges, and scholars
another part of the grammar of interbranch dialogue. In doing so, we
reveal a new set of opportunities and challenges, allowing legislatures
and courts to develop statutory law together.
I. LEGISLATIVE UNDERWRITES AND WHAT THEY MEAN
In this Part, we first identify and explain what we count as an
underwrite (Section I.A). We then furnish numerous examples of
legislative underwrites at both federal and state levels, suggesting that
legislatures confer these endorsements with enough frequency to
command analysis, notwithstanding the lack of scholarly attention to this
form of interbranch exchange (Section I.B). Finally, we recognize
additional factors that may contribute nuance or complexity to the
underwrite category-in particular, differences among underwrites that
are central rather than peripheral to a statute's development, as well as
underwrites that are accompanied by overrides (Section I.C).
A. Underwrites' Domain
We define underwrites to include both enacted text that cross-
references decided cases, as well as authoritative legislative history that
is created during an enactment process and that endorses a prior judicial
decision on a matter of statutory interpretation. The legislative body may
endorse decisions of a relevant jurisdiction's highest court, or it may
highlight lower court decisions that it believes correctly captured
statutory meaning. 15
15 For an example of a legislative underwrite of a lower level court, consider Blanchard v.
Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1989), which references the Senate and House Committee
Reports on the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. Those committee reports,
in turn, explicitly invoked factors relevant to determining a reasonable attorney's fee, set
forth in a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit opinion, Johnson v. Georgia Highway
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There are several ways in which enacted laws can clearly underwrite
judicial decisions. First, legislatures can write a provision in a statute
that directly cites to or quotes from a judicial opinion, with relevant
explanation. These textual underwrites may occur in a preamble,
findings section, purpose section, or within the substantive law itself.16
To be sure, underwrites within statutory texts need not necessarily
endorse statutory judicial decisions. Rather, the practice can be thought
to include underwrites of constitutional adjudications, treaty
interpretations, and common law decisions (though the latter are more
routinely called "codifications") as well. In what follows, however, we
focus on statutory underwriting: when a legislature underwrites a
statutory interpretation decision. These sorts of underwrites implicate a
distinctive analysis, and the conclusions one reaches about statutory
underwrites do not necessarily carry over into underwriting practices for
other types of judicial decisions.IT
But underwriting as we understand it also can occur within the
legislature without encoding the legislative approval into enacted
statutory text. For example, House and Senate committees, or a joint
committee of both the House and Senate, can place clear statements into
Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). The House report described key
Johnson factors to be considered, while the Senate report identified several district court
decisions as having "correctly applied" the Johnson factors, citing Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974); and Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 E.P.D.
9444 (C.D. Cal. 1974). H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, at 8-9 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 6
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5913.
16 See, e.g., Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw Nations Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1779 (2002) (citing and discussing Indian treaty cases United States v. Cherokee Nation,
480 U.S. 700 (1987), and Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970), in
congressional fmdings); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)
(seeking explicitly to endorse the constitutional law announced in Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), in congressional purposes
provisions); American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1996a(a) (acknowledging and asserting a workaround for Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990), in a congressional findings and declarations provision); Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 387a-l(2)(E) (2009) (instructing
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in a substantive provision of the law, to ensure
that regulation of tobacco products comports with First Amendment law in Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)).
17 For example, underwrites of a constitutional decision may have to yield to altered or
evolved judicial understandings of the same constitutional issue on account of a dominant
conception of judicial supremacy in the field of constitutional law. See infra Subsection
II.C.5.
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relevant reports accompanying a piece of legislation, indicating explicit
approval of a court decision.18 Again, one can imagine that underwrites
in these reports might include authoritative endorsement of
constitutional law, treaty law, or common law decisions in legislative
history.1 9 Still, we think the statutory context is distinctive because of
18 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 92-238, at 5 n.1, 8, 21 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2137, 2141 n.1, 2144, 2156 (citing with approval, inter alia, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); and
Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969)); S. Rep. No. 92-415, at 5 n. 1,
8 n.4 (1971) (same). There has been some question as to whether Congress was underwriting
Griggs in its 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because these committee
reports were attached to a bill that was never passed, the Equal Opportunity of Employment
Act of 1971. The substitute bill that became the 1972 amendments differed from the earlier
bill principally with respect to the enforcement mechanism for the newly empowered EEOC:
cease and desist orders modeled on the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") (earlier
bill) versus judicial enforcement in district court (substitute bill). See Herbert Hill, The
Equal Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and 1972: A Critical Analysis of the
Legislative History and Administration of the Law, 2 Indus. Rel. L.J. 1, 47-51 (1977).
Although the substitute bill that became the 1972 amendments did not contain language
ratifying Griggs, leading proponents of both versions consistently cited Griggs with approval
during the House and Senate floor debates. Compare Katherine J. Thomson, The Disparate
Impact Theory: Congressional Intent in 1972-A Response to Gold, 8 Indus. Rel. L.J. 105,
105-06 (1986) (arguing that the 1972 amendments were a codification of Griggs), with
Michael Evan Gold, Reply to Thomson, 8 Indus. Rel. L.J. 117, 117 (1986) (denying that
Congress accepted Griggs in 1972). See generally L. Camille Hbert, Redefining the
Burdens of Proof in Title VII Litigation: Will the Disparate Impact Theory Survive Wards
Cove and the Civil Rights Act of 1990?, 32 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 42-45 (1990) (discussing the
1972 Act's legislative history on this point). We find the Thomson-H1bert arguments more
persuasive than Gold's, but for our purposes it is more important to show that Congress can
deliberately and expressly endorse decisions in the most reliable forms of federal legislative
history than it is to establish whether the 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964
should be read as an underwrite of Griggs.
Another example may be found in the House Report to the Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, at 96 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4733 (ratifying a regulatory approach to cable service
endorsed by courts in the following cases: New York State Cable Commission v. FCC, 669
F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1982); General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. United States, 449 F.2d
846 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); FCC v.
Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979); and United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406
U.S. 649 (1972)). Note here that the legislature is underwriting judicial cases, which
themselves underwrite agency action. As we explain in this Section, we exclude direct
endorsement of agency action from our analyses to follow.
19 Consider the Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075. The House's
committee report drew freely on Supreme Court cases applying common law concepts that
the House was purporting to codify in the new legislation. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222,
at 2, 4, 8-9 (1909). The Senate's committee report was identical. See also S. Rep. No. 60-
1108, at 2, 4, 8-9 (1909). At the state level, one might consider New York's Field Code a
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the relatively clear norm of legislative supremacy in U.S. statutory law,
which does not apply as forcefully in the other contexts.
To be sure, formalists of certain stripes would not consider as legally
relevant any action taken by a legislature that is not enacted as
legislation through requisite procedures. 20 Accordingly, such formalists
would not admit any legislative history as a legal underwriting. Our
view is that, because committee reports are the gold standard for reliable
legislative history-and they are the place that would be most natural for
legislators to discuss judicial decisions-it is reasonable to include in the
underwrite category such legal analysis by legislators from both
chambers when the reports are in agreement.
There are, however, certain other types of more indirect actions or
omissions that do not qualify as forms of underwriting under our
approach. Most prominently, mere legislative silence in the face of a
judicial decision is insufficient to deem a decision endorsed by a
relevant legislature. Of course, it is well known that judges sometimes
take silence to be a form of acquiescence.21 Whatever one thinks of the
legal relevance of legislative inaction, we are not treating the absence of
articulated support for judicial interpretations as a form of underwriting.
We also exclude instances of mere reenactment, which are often treated
by the judiciary as sub silentio endorsements of courts' reigning
statutory interpretations that precede the reenactment.22 As we are
codification project of the common law (that both ratifies common law and overrides it, too).
See generally Charles M. Cook, The American Codification Movement: A Study of
Antebellum Legal Reform (1981) (analyzing various so-called "codification movements" in
the states); Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical
Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 Law & Hist. Rev. 311 (1988) (providing analysis
of Field's thinking). Whether codification of common law decisions should be thought of as
a species of underwrites ultimately is not pertinent to our discussion of statutory underwrites
here.
20 The most notable adherent of this type of formalism was Justice Scalia. See generally
Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 17 (Amy Gutmann
ed., 1997) (repudiating the use of legislative history as irrelevant to determining the
legislature's "objectified" intent). Prominent defenses of this view can be found in John F.
Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70 (2006); Brett
M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118 (2016) (reviewing
Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes (2014)); and John F. Manning, Why Does Congress
Vote on Some Texts but Not Others?, 51 Tulsa L. Rev. 559 (2016) (reviewing the same).
21 See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987); Flood v. Kuhn, 407
U.S. 258,283-84 (1972).
22 See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567 (1988); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 300-
01 (1981); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978); Gregory, supra note 9, at 33.
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aiming to identify and examine the costs and benefits associated with
deliberative engagement rather than implied signals and presumptions,
we exclude many sounds of silence from the legislature. We would also
exclude mere citation with no explanation from a legislature about the
element of a judicial decision that it is endorsing. We shall say more
about the doctrines of acquiescence and their relationship to
underwriting in Part III.
We also do not treat as underwrites in this Article statutes that directly
approve agency regulations. Rather, we isolate for consideration
legislative-judicial interaction in a relatively conscious and pure form,
although we do discuss certain implications for agency authority
resulting from underwritten judicial decisions.23 One can certainly make
a case for considering underwrites of agency decisions (whether rules,
adjudications, or more informal guidances). Congressional committee
staff care a good deal about what agencies do. And unlike courts,
agencies interact with congressional committees on a regular basis;
those committees also engage in active oversight of agency operations.
Not surprisingly, underwrites of agency statutory interpretations appear
to occur with some frequency.24 There is no question that mapping the
"trialogue" among administrators, courts, and legislatures would be a
valuable goal.25
23 See infra Sections IB, 11.A (discussing the impact of judicial underwrites on the
doctrine of agency nonacquiescence).
24 See, e.g., Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 144-74, § 603, 129 Stat. 584, 597-
98 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13951(t) (Supp. HII 2016)) (underwriting the definition of
dedicated hospital emergency department, set forth in 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(b), in connection
with the statutory regulation of off-campus hospital outpatient departments); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395y(c)(2)(A) (2012) (underwriting the definition of identical, related, or similar drug, set
forth in 21 C.F.R. § 310.6, as part of the statutory exclusion of Medicare coverage for certain
drug products); Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 103, 104 Stat.
978, 979 (1990) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012)) (underwriting employee benefit plan
payment rules set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10, as they were in effect on June 22, 1989).
Statutory interpretation routinely takes place in all three branches, and the full "trialogue"
ultimately must account for agency interpretation as well. See generally Matthew C.
Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, in Research Handbook on Public Choice
and Public Law 285 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010) (examining the
role of agencies as statutory interpreters); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the
Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of
Legislative History, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 321 (1990) (same).
25 For one effort to think through the "trialogue" on the (perhaps even more complex)
European stage, see Fabrizio Cafaggi, On the Transformations of European Consumer
Enforcement Law: Judicial and Administrative Trialogues, Instruments and Effects, in
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Yet it is challenging enough to address the benefits and costs of
underwrites involving legislatures and courts throughout the judicial
hierarchy. Underwrites of agency regulations implicate additional
complexities, such as whether a legislature may constrain courts to
adhere to executive branch interpretations the courts have never
examined, and the impact of such underwrites on existing doctrines of
agency deference. Leaving those important questions for another day,
we focus here on the core exchanges between courts and legislatures
engaged in expressly bilateral interaction, not triangulation with the
executive branch. Legislative-judicial dialogue is central to the field of
statutory interpretation. That is where we start, exposing a modality this
dialogue takes that is too often ignored.
B. Examples of Statutory Underwrites
1. Underwrites by Congress
In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010 ("Dodd-Frank"),26 Congress altered the framework for invoking
preemption by the National Bank Act against state law claims. Congress
had last stated a position on preemption in the 1864 Act,27 giving the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") delegated authority
to implement the Act and practical authority to preempt state law.28
Ultimately, in the 1996 case of Barnett Bank of Marion County v.
Nelson,29 the U.S. Supreme Court evaluated a state law prohibition on
banks that sell insurance. In holding that the state law was preempted as
it applied to a national bank, the Court emphasized that state laws could
not "impair significantly" a national bank's powers under the National
Bank Act.30 Then, in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Congress
passed an explicit endorsement of the Court's work in Barnett Bank,
citing the case within the text of the statute and incorporating language
from the case, as follows:
Judicial Cooperation in European Private Law 223 (Fabrizio Cafaggi & Stephanie Law eds.,
2017).
26 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2012)).
27 12 U.S.C. §§ 85, 86 (1864).
28 Id. § 93(a) (2012).
29 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
3 1 Id. at 33, 37.
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In accordance with the legal standards for preemption set forth in the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Barnett Bank of
Marion County N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996), no State may, by
statute, regulation, order, interpretation, or other action, prevent or
significantly interfere with the ability of a depository institution... to
engage ... in any insurance sales, solicitation, or crossmarketing
activity.
3 1
Congress again endorsed the Barnett Bank standard more generally in
Dodd-Frank:
State consumer financial laws are preempted, only if ... in
accordance with the legal standard for preemption in the decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States in Barnett Bank of Marion
County, N.A. v. Nelson, Florida Insurance Commissioner, et al., 517
U.S. 25 (1996), the State consumer financial law prevents or
significantly interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its
powers; and any preemption determination under this subparagraph
may be made by a court, or by regulation or order of the Comptroller
of the Currency on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with applicable
law.3
2
And this was not the only explicit underwrite in Dodd-Frank.
Congress also sought to endorse a 2009 decision by the Supreme Court
which held that the OCC was unreasonable in trying to preempt the
power of states to investigate national banks in enforcing their own laws
(known as "visitorial powers").33
31 15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2)(A) (2012).
32 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B) (2012). While engaging in this underwrite, Congress overrode
the decision in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 550 U.S. 1, 12, 21 (2007), which, although it
reaffirmed Barnett Bank, also extended national bank provisions-including its preemption
regime-to subsidiaries of national banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(e) (2012) ("[A] State
consumer financial law shall apply to a subsidiary or affiliate of a national bank (other than a
subsidiary or affiliate that is chartered as a national bank) to the same extent that the State
consumer financial law applies to any person, corporation, or other entity subject to such
State law."); see also id. § 25b(b)(2) (forswearing from preempting applicability of state law
to subsidiaries); id. § 25b(h)(2) (same).
" See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(i)(1) ("In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Cuomo v. Clearing House Assn., L.L.C. (129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009)), no
provision of title 62 of the Revised Statutes which relates to visitorial powers or otherwise
limits or restricts the visitorial authority to which any national bank is subject shall be
construed as limiting or restricting the authority of any attorney general (or other chief law
enforcement officer) of any State to bring an action against a national bank in a court of
[Vol. 103:14871500
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A potentially more familiar underwrite in the statute books comes
from the Civil Rights Act of 1991.14 This overhaul of the nation's civil
rights laws is probably best known as an override statute because it takes
direct aim at an unusually high number of previous Supreme Court
decisions that Congress took to be too restrictive in their interpretations
of statutory employment discrimination protections.35 However, the
purposes section of the Act3 6 also underwrote an important Supreme
Court case from 1971, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,37 which established
the "disparate impact theory" of employment discrimination as
actionable under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 38 In this regard, the text
of the enacted 1991 law contained an unambiguous underwrite of
Griggs. In short, in all of the aforementioned instances, Congress was
appropriate jurisdiction to enforce an applicable law and to seek relief as authorized by such
law.").
14 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012)).
35 See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(11), at 2-4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694-
96 (discussing, inter alia, rejections of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes,
491 U.S. 754 (1989); Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987);
Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986);
and Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985)).
31 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991). Section 3 of the Act reads in full:
SEC. 3. PURPOSES.
The purposes of this Act are-
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful
harassment in the workplace;
(2) to codify the concepts of "business necessity" and "job related" enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and
in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989);
(3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines for the
adjudication of disparate impact suits under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.); and
(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope
of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to
victims of discrimination.
Id. The U.S. Code includes this enacted text as a note. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (2012).
" 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
38Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 703(a)-(b), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(2012)).
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quite clear in enacted text that it was endorsing a Supreme Court reading
of statutory product.
In other instances that we would also consider underwrites, Congress
can pass laws containing statutory findings that for one reason or
another do not make their way into the U.S. Code and do not specifically
name the cases being underwritten. For example, in the Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Congress put into its
findings that "the [Securities and Exchange] Commission has, within the
limits of accepted administrative and judicial construction of such rules
and regulations, enforced such rules and regulations vigorously,
effectively, and fairly."39 Although Congress chose not to define insider
trading statutorily beyond what the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 set
in motion in Section 10(b),40  it clearly was endorsing the
"misappropriation doctrine" the courts had developed, finding that
trading on misappropriations of material nonpublic information
constitutes violations of the Act (per SEC Rule 10b5-1,41  which
implemented the Exchange Act).
There is no real question that Congress was using the findings of the
1988 Act to underwrite the "judicial construction" that preceded it,
specifically, the misappropriation doctrine.42 To the extent there was any
confusion, a relevant committee report made the underwrite plain.43 And
although a number of justices seemed sympathetic to the
misappropriation theory of insider trading in Chiarella v. United States
in 1980,44 the underwrite effectuated by Congress in 1988 was focused
3 9 Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 2, 102 Stat. 4677, 4677 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 note
(2012)) (emphasis added).
40 See Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(2012)).
41 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2015).
42 Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 2, 102 Stat. at 4677. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating
State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 1189, 1233 (1995) ("Congress's action amounts to an express legislative endorsement
of the misappropriation theory."); Steve Thel, Statutory Findings and Insider Trading
Regulation, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 1091, 1111 (1997).
43 See H.R. Rep. No. 100-910, at 8-10 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043,
6045-47. There was no Senate report associated with this legislation.
44 445 U.S. 222 (1980); see id. at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating
that "a person violates § 10(b) whenever he improperly obtains or converts to his own
benefit nonpublic information"); id. at 240-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (advocating a broad
application of the misappropriation theory); id. at 246 (Blackmun & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting) (suggesting that § 10(b) encompasses the misappropriation theory).
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most directly on judicial construction in the circuit courts. 4 5 As it
underwrote one case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit (and plenty of work by the SEC), Congress also explicitly
overrode another Second Circuit decision that was less supportive of the
misappropriation theory.46
Our last example of a congressional underwrite is taken from "pure"
legislative history accompanying an enactment, but it involves the gold
standard thereof. This arises when the text of the enacted law does not
obviously endorse a judicial interpretation of a statute, but the House
and Senate reports associated with the enacted law make explicit that a
prior judicial interpretation should be followed and that statutory
meaning is to be rendered consistent with this statutory decision of a
high court. An example of this form of underwrite comes from
Congress's comprehensive revision of the Copyright Act in 1976.47
The previous overhaul of the nation's copyright statutes-repealed
and superseded by the 1976 Act-was in 1909.48 Much case law
intervened over the ensuing decades, some of which Congress sought to
underwrite, some of which it sought to override. Most clearly, both the
House4 9 and the Senate 5° reports that accompanied the 1976 Act
45 See H.R. Rep. No. 100-910, at 10 (citing United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d
Cir. 1986), aff'd on securities law counts by an equally divided court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987)),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6047.
46 See id. at 26-27, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6063-64 ("[Tlhe codification of
a right of action for contemporaneous traders is specifically intended to overturn court cases
which have precluded recovery for plaintiffs where the defendant's violation is premised
upon the misappropriation theory. See[,] e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.
1983). The Committee believes that this result is inconsistent with the remedial purposes of
the Exchange Act, and that the misappropriation theory fulfills appropriate regulatory
objectives in determining when communicating or trading while in possession of material
nonpublic information is unlawful."). This example highlights Congress's agreement (and
disagreement) with a court decision. We acknowledge, of course, that this area of law is very
much driven by agency activity and rules in the SEC. But, as we explained, we are not
focusing on the legislature's direct endorsement of agency positions or on the legislature's
effort to signal to the courts about how they should assess the validity of agency positions.
47 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810 (2012)).
48 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075.
49 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 54-55, 105 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5667-68, 5720.
50 S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 53, 86-87 (1975) ("In accordance with the Supreme Court's
decision in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), works of 'applied art' encompass all
original pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works that are intended to be or have been
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discussed and endorsed the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Mazer v.
Stein.' In that case, the Court held copyrightable a statuette design that
was part of a lamp base, notwithstanding the possibility that its utility
could bring it within the scope of design patent protection and outside
the scope of copyright.5 2 The reports discussed the case, approving its
rationale that useful articles could still receive some copyright protection
(when the applied art was separable from the utilitarian aspects of the
item), and stating unequivocally that courts construing the new version
of the statute should continue to apply it the way the Supreme Court had
applied the old 1909 version to find copyrightability within useful
articles.53
2. Underwrites by State Legislatures
As is true for Congress, underwrites by state legislatures appear in
text, legislative history, and both. The examples we identify below come
from four geographically diverse states and address doctrinal areas of
embodied in useful articles, regardless of factors such as mass production, commercial
exploitation, and the potential availability of design patent protection.... Section 113 deals
with the extent of copyright protection in 'works of applied art.' The section takes as its
starting point the Supreme Court's decision in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), and the
first sentence of subsection (a) restates the basic principle established by that decision. The
rule of Mazer, as affirmed by the bill, is that copyright in a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
work will not be affected if the work is employed as the design of a useful article, and will
afford protection to the copyright owner against the unauthorized reproduction of his work in
useful as well as nonuseful articles.").
5 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
52 Id. at 213-14, 217.
13 17 U.S.C. §§ 102 note, 113 note (2012). As it happens, the Supreme Court just
addressed some of the confusion in this area of law in Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands,
137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017). It has proven remarkably hard to know what part of useful articles
(in the case at issue, cheerleading uniforms) is actually copyrightable work and what is
excluded as a "useful article." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). Notably, the Sixth Circuit drew on
the House Report's discussion of Mazer to find the relevant uniforms copyrightable, using
the Report's endorsement of "conceptual separability" instead of "physical separability." See
Varsity Brands v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 481 n.6, 490 n.12 (6th Cir. 2015)
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 47, 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5660, 5668). When the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit in an opinion by
Justice Thomas, it did not cite the relevant House Report, but it did explain how Congress
endorsed Mazer by lifting language from post-Mazer regulations by the Copyright Office.
Star Athletica, LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1011-12. Justice Breyer's dissent, however, made
substantial use of the relevant House Report in seeking to implement Congress's
understanding of Mazer during the passage of the 1976 act. Id. at 1031-32 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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disability law, financial institutions law, civil procedure, family law, and
election law.
a. New Jersey
Under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA"),54 a question unanswered in the statute is which party bears
the burden of proof-an individual family or a school district-in
disputes over the nature and extent of required special education
support. A New Jersey law enacted in 2008 placed the burden of proof
on school districts in these IDEA due process hearings." In doing so, the
statutory text expressly underwrote a holding by the New Jersey
Supreme Court to that effect, Lascari v. Board of Education.56 The state
legislature responded to a 2005 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Schaffer v.
Weast, which held that the IDEA burden was on the party seeking relief
(this could be an individual family or a school district) while leaving
open the question of whether state legislatures could effectively modify
the Court's decision by always placing the burden on the school
district.57 Both the New Jersey statutory text and its accompanying
Assembly Committee statement made clear that the 2008 law
underwrote the Lascari holding.58
Another example from New Jersey involves mortgage foreclosure
actions. In 2009, the legislature filled a gap in its 1995 Fair Foreclosure
Act by underwriting an intervening appellate division decision that had
applied a twenty-year statute of limitations to a residential mortgage
foreclosure action based on a default due to nonpayment.59 The new
statutory text specifying the twenty-year limitation period for instituting
such a foreclosure suit did not refer expressly to the appeals court
decision, but both the Assembly Committee Statement and the Senate
14 Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-82 (2012)).
51 See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:46-1.1 (West 2013).
16 560 A.2d 1180 (N.J. 1989). The New Jersey Supreme Court had held that the school
district should bear the burden of proof under federal regulations promulgated pursuant to
the IDEA's predecessor statute, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. Id.
at 1188.
5' 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005).
58 See § 18A:46-1.1; N.J. Assemb. Educ. Comm. Statement, Assemb. 212-4076, 2d Ann.
Sess. (2007).
59 See § 2A:50-56.1 (underwriting the holding in Security National Partners v. Mahler,
763 A.2d 804, 808 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000)).
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Committee Report were explicit that the amendment underwrote the
holding in that case.6°
b. California
In 2003, the California legislature added Section 340.8 to the state
Code of Civil Procedure, specifying the time for bringing tort actions
based on exposure to hazardous materials or toxic substances.6' Section
1 of the statute codified the doctrine of delayed discovery for these toxic
tort actions.62 Section 2 of the enacted text stated: "It is the intent of the
Legislature to [endorse] the rulings" on the doctrine of delayed
discovery set forth in a California appellate court decision, Clark v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp.,6 construing two earlier state supreme court
cases (also cited in Section 2), and to disapprove a contrary ruling by
another appellate court panel.64 In addition to this explicit text, both the
Assembly Committee and Senate Committee bill analyses clearly stated
that the legislature intended to underwrite Clark.6 5
c. New York
In one important example, the New York legislature amended the
state's domestic relations law 66 to underwrite an earlier path-breaking
decision from the New York Court of Appeals that permitted the
adoption of a child by the unmarried adult partner of the child's
biological parent, whether the partner was heterosexual or homosexual.67
60 See N.J. Assemb. Fin. Insts. & Ins. Comm. Statement, Assemb. 213-3269, 1st Ann.
Sess. (2008); N.J. S. Commerce Comm. Statement, S. 213-250, 1st Ann. Sess., at 1 (2008).
61 Ch. 873, S. 331, Act of Oct. 12, 2003, Legis. Couns. Dig. 443-44 (discussing that the
bill adds § 340.8, relating to toxic injuries, to the Code of Civil Procedure).
62 Act of Oct. 12, 2003, ch. 873, 2003 Cal. Stat. 6398-99 (codified at Cal. Civ. Proc.
§ 340.8). Section 1 provides that such actions shall commence no later than two years from
the date of injury or when the plaintiff became aware of the injury, its cause, and "sufficient
facts to put a reasonable person on inquiry notice that the injury was caused or contributed to
by the wrongful act of another." Id.
63 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 223 (Ct. App. 2000).
64 Ch. 873, 2003 Cal. Stat. 6399. The statutory text in § 1, quoted supra note 62, tracks the
discussion in Clark, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 228.
65 See Cal. Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, S. 331, 2003-04 Reg. Sess., at 1 (2003); Cal. S.
Judiciary Comm., S. 331, 2003-04 Reg. Sess., at 2 (2003).
66Act of Sept. 17, 2010, ch. 509, 2010 N.Y. Laws 1364-65 (codified at N.Y. Dom. Rel.
§ 110 (McKinney 2010)).
67 See In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 405 (N.Y. 1995).
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The court expansively construed the earlier text-which provided that
"[a]n adult unmarried person or an adult husband and his adult wife
together may adopt another person"68-in light of the statute's purpose
to advance the best interest of the child and in acknowledgment of the
changing realities of family life.69 Fifteen years later, the Senate
Introducer's Memorandum in support of the bill acknowledged that
some lower courts were still narrowly interpreting the word "together"
so as to preclude the ability of unmarried couples to adopt a child
together.7v Accordingly, the Memorandum explained that the legislation
"codifies the Court of Appeal's [sic] decision in Matter of Jacob and
Matter of Dana" while also clarifying the domestic relations law to
assure that "unmarried adult couples may jointly adopt a child together
where neither is the biological parent of the child.
71
In a second example from New York, a 2005 New York Court of
Appeals decision adjudicated the validity of 163 affidavit ballots in a
close State Senate race. 2 The ballots came from registered voters who
went to the right polling site but for one reason or another voted in the
wrong election district. Finding the ballots valid under then-current
statutes, the Court of Appeals found "ministerial error by the board of
elections or any of its employees [which] caused such ballot envelope[s]
not to be valid on [their] face.",73 By "infer[ring]" "ministerial error"
under the statute rather than requiring a showing of such error in some
way, the court interpreted the state's election law in a manner that was
reasonable though not obvious or necessary. 74 Accordingly, in 2009, the
state legislature sought to amend the state's election law to require the
counting of ballots when voters appear and cast their ballots at the
68 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 110 (McKinney 1999) (emphasis added).
69 See Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 399-401.
70 See New York State Senate Introducer's Memorandum in Support, S. 232-1523A
(2009).
71 Id. The issue of neither member of an unmarried couple being the biological parent had
not been before the Court of Appeals in 1995. Id.
72 See Panio v. Sunderland, 824 N.E.2d 488 (N.Y. 2005) (per curiam).
73 Id. at 490 (citing and quoting N.Y. Elec. Law § 16-106(1) (McKinney 2009) and N.Y.
Elec. Law § 9-209(2)(a)(2) (McKinney 2009)).
74 See id. (noting the minimal likelihood of fraud when a voter appears in person with
identification before board personnel, the court concluded it could "reasonably infer" that an
affidavit ballot cast at the correct polling place but the wrong election district results from
ministerial error by a poll worker who fails to direct the voter to the correct table).
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correct polling place but at the wrong election district.75 Although the
text of the statute did not mention the Court of Appeals decision,76 the
memorandum created by the senator who introduced the statute and the
Assembly Memorandum in support both made clear that the amendment
underwrote the 2005 New York Court of Appeals decision, mentioning
it explicitly in sections entitled "Justification., 77 Each memorandum
quoted the court's reasoning that "we can reasonably infer that casting
an affidavit ballot at the correct polling place but the wrong election
district is the result of ministerial error on the part of the poll worker in
failing to direct the voter to the correct table. 7 8 The underwrite thereby
locked in a potentially contestable decision that could have been walked
back by a different Court of Appeals, with a different political
configuration. In doing so, it prevented subsequent judicial tampering
with this aspect of the state's election law.
d. Wisconsin
Finally, a 2006 Wisconsin statute made numerous substantive
changes to the state laws regulating protective placement and protective
services for persons with disabilities. 79 The accompanying Legislative
Council Act Memo explained that the new statute underwrote several
different state court decisions, specifically court cases that mandated a
protective placement hearing when a court appoints a guardian for
incompetent persons in a nursing home,80 provided that an interested
person may participate in protective placement hearings at the court's
discretion,8' and established requirements and procedures for annual
" Act of July 28, 2009, ch. 248, 2009 N.Y. Laws 939 (codified at N.Y. Elec. § 9-209
(McKinney 2009)).
76 N.Y. Elec. Law § 9-209(2)(a)(i)(E)(iii) (Consol. Supp. 2017).
77 See N.Y. Spons. Memo., S. 232-1554 (2009); N.Y. State Assemb. Memo. in Support of
Legislation, Assemb. 232-4962 (2009).
78 See N.Y. Spons. Memo., S. 232-1554 (2009) (quoting Panio, 824 N.E.2d at 490); N.Y.
State Assemb. Memo. in Support of A. 4962, Assemb. 232-4962 (2009) (same).
79 Act of Apr. 5, 2006, ch. 55, 2005 Wis. Sess. Laws 999 (codified at scattered sections of
Wis. Stat. (2017)).
80 Wisconsin Legislative Council Act Memo, Assemb. 785, at 6 (2005) (discussing
underwrite of Agnes T. v. Milwaukee County, 525 N.W.2d 268 (Wis. 1995)).
81 Id. at 9 (discussing underwrite of Coston v. Joseph P., 586 N.W.2d 52 (Wis. Ct. App.
1998)).
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reviews of such protective placements. 82 The text of the statute included
notes that referred specifically to these court decisions. 83
In summary, we have explored three archetypes of legislative
statutory underwrites, using nearly a dozen separate examples derived
from a broad range of doctrinal areas in both federal and state law: (1)
text of enacted law that cites and endorses a case (usually but not always
of the highest court); (2) text of enacted law that endorses judicial
constructions (whether of the highest court or of appellate level courts)
with clear legislative history identifying approved cases; and (3) clear
legislative history in both legislative chambers' committee reports
accompanying enacted law signaling an underwrite. There may be
underwrites worth considering that take other forms, but for now we
limit the core of our analysis to these archetypes. Moreover, as these
examples suggest, the phenomenon of legislative underwriting is quite
widespread in federal and state codes.84
C. Added Dimensions
Before turning to evaluate the costs and benefits of underwriting
practices in legislatures, it is worth complicating the picture a bit to
highlight that underwrites--even of the archetypal forms we have
outlined here--can present themselves in quite different contextual
82 Id. at 20 (discussing underwrite of County of Dunn v. Goldie H., 629 N.W.2d 189 (Wis.
2001)).
83 See ch. 55, 2005 Wis. Sess. Laws at 1002, 1004, 1009.
84 Underwrites also take place at the local legislative level. A recent example comes from
New York City Human Rights Law, Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8-
130(c) (2016):
Cases that have correctly understood and analyzed the liberal construction requirement
of subdivision a of this section and that have developed legal doctrines accordingly that
reflect the broad and remedial purposes of this title include Albunio v. City of New
York, 16 N.Y.3d 472 (2011), Bennett v. Health Management Systems, Inc., 92 A.D.3d
29 (1st Dep't 2011), and the majority opinion in Williams v. New York City Housing
Authority, 61 A.D. 3d 62 (1st Dep't 2009).
This local underwriting has a City Council underwriting lower-level state appellate cases and
the New York Court of Appeals. Local underwritings may ultimately be sui generis because
the city's legislature cannot control the development of state law. On some unique features
of the local legal ecosystem, see Ethan J. Leib, Local Judges and Local Government, 18
N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 707, 715-16 (2015).
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settings. We do not want to ignore such complications. Rather, we
believe that some of these facets of underwriting practices will serve to
enrich our evaluative discussion in Parts II and III.
First, notice that some underwrites appear to be part of an ongoing
conversation that a legislature and a judicial branch are having over time
within one issue area, while others look like "plucking" judicial ideas
and integrating them into a possibly distinct statutory structure. To draw
from the examples described above, the federal copyright laws and the
New York adoption statute seem like the former sort, in which the
underwrite is integral to the statute's development over time. By
contrast, Congress's borrowing of judicial preemption standards within
Dodd-Frank seems more like the latter. Although it is premature to
analyze these different efforts by legislatures, it would seem that the
former underwrites reflect the sort of exchange that makes statutory
interpretation and legislative supremacy coherent. By contrast, it is
harder to know what to say about the use of legal tests that are
developed under one set of facts and then transplanted into another legal
regime without too much elaboration.
A second nuance is contrasting what one might call "stand-alone"
underwrites and those which are embedded in or are passed in
conjunction with overrides. Both the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the
Copyright Act of 1976 described above are quite clear examples of
Congress seeking to calibrate its policy by carefully telling the courts the
cases it is rejecting along with those it is approving. Even the much
shorter Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 we described above
had Congress both underwriting and overriding at the same time to give
instructions about just what kind of misappropriation theory it was
endorsing. By contrast, New Jersey's statute of limitations for
foreclosure actions is an archetypal "stand-alone" underwrite which only
references the case it is endorsing without identifying any related cases
it is rejecting.
One might think of "stand-alone" underwrites as akin to surgical
strikes by the legislature-helping judges to see just what they get right
and enabling the meaning of the underwrite to be clear as day for courts
in future cases. Especially in domains where the underwrite is integral to
a statute's development over time, a stand-alone underwrite would seem
to be a very useful intervention by the legislature. But notice that if the
stand-alone underwrite is of the "plucking" form instead, it might be
especially difficult to ascertain its full meaning without additional
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context. Transposition from one setting (a preemption standard in one
legal regime as applied to another, for example) might not be as easy for
courts to apply in future cases without substantially more elaboration. In
such instances, having a litany of underwrites and overrides together
could be useful for interpreters in the future to understand legislative
meaning. Indeed, even outside the plucking environment, overrides and
underwrites together may usefully give courts more information about
legislative intent. These elaborations can be helpful in calibrating policy,
in knowing whether an underwrite should be construed broadly, and in
ascertaining how portable an underwrite should be outside its narrow
domain.85
After this descriptive primer on an underappreciated phenomenon that
occurs in legislatures with some frequency, we turn to a more normative
evaluation of whether it is ultimately a productive venture for
legislatures to be in the business of underwriting. Below we offer a
rough cost-benefit analysis.
II. WHY UNDERWRITE?
In this Part, we are explicit about the disadvantages (Section II.A) and
advantages (Section II.B) of underwrites in our legal systems. We begin
with the possible costs, in part because they appear more obvious and
also because they are more in line with the received wisdom that
elevating the status of underwrites would seem a departure from the
standard picture of institutional exchange between courts and
legislatures. After concluding that underwriting is probably, on balance,
a productive enterprise, we present some thoughts (in Section II.C)
about certain as-applied aspects of underwrites that shed additional light
on our evaluative arguments.
As should be evident by this point, we approach the role of
underwrites from a "legal process" perspective. What this means is that
we are inclined to view an underwrite as a reinforcing instruction from
the legislature to its agents.8 6 While the special force of a two-branch
85 We address these issues more directly in Section II.C.
86 Legislative reinforcement may take the form of applauding a court for correctly
construing what the legislature meant all along or of enacting a new text that endorses a
court's approach to the prior statute.
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pronouncement may at times be sufficient to establish a kind of super-
precedent,8 7 we have concerns that enshrining such a status could dilute
the ordinary significance of stare decisis.88 Further, notwithstanding our
legal process predilections, we are sensitive to potential risks that can be
associated with the practice as legislators, judges, or lawyers may
strategically initiate or interpret underwrites to further their own self-
interested outcomes. We also recognize that statutes may have different
political economies that can affect the congressional appetite for
underwriting. For instance, a statute that generates relatively little
judicial attention, or that is rarely considered for possible updating by a
legislature, is not likely to generate much mobilized opposition against
those looking for an underwrite, rendering its passage much less
meaningful than an underwrite that is carefully added to limit the ambit
of an override or an underwrite that is supported from a salient coalition
of interest groups openly debating the future direction of complex
policy.
These factors are all relevant for the assessment of costs and benefits,
to which we now turn.
A. Costs
It is a truism that "no legislation is cost-free," 9 and there are specific
costs associated with clarifying statutory language through overrides and
underwrites. 90 It is worth being clear about certain distinctive costs
associated with underwriting so that we can draw some normative
conclusions about the value of the practice in the final analysis.
One obvious and potentially significant issue involves opportunity
costs. When we first commenced this project, we had a general sense of
the possibility for underwriting, and we thought abstractly about whether
it would be a beneficial addition to the theory and practice of statutory
interpretation. We had assumed it would be a relatively rare
phenomenon and that we would have to look hard to find examples. We
87 Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (stating that presidential authority is at its maximum "[w]hen the President
acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress").
88 See infra Sections I.B, M.A.
89 Edward 0. Correia, A Legislative Conception of Legislative Supremacy, 42 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 1129, 1163 (1992).
90 See Brudney, supra note 9, at 20-40.
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made this assumption because, superficially, it seems like an impractical
way for a legislature to spend its time. The opportunity cost for spending
time on underwrites might be forgoing work solving new social
problems. This is especially true when the status quo "pre-underwrite"
presumptively accords with legislative preferences (even if the relevant
precedent is not yet "supercharged"). One might feel that legislators
ought to spend their time addressing current policy issues, conducting
oversight of executive branch activities, or responding to pressing
requests from their constituents. Once a court decides that a law means
something, the legislative underwrite for emphasis or confirmation can
seem like wasted energy.
Those opportunity costs, however, do not seem to dissuade
legislatures from engaging in underwriting after all, as we reported in
Part I. Our examples at the state level are often stand-alone bills that, in
expressing support for one or more court decisions, anchor that
precedent while sweeping aside any confusion or tension that may have
arisen from other intervening judicial rulings. Our examples at the
federal level tend to include instances when the legislature is already
passing a law on a related subject in which the underwrite is part of that
larger statute, at times combined with disapproval of other contrary
court decisions. To be sure, some quantum of time that the legislature
takes up drafting underwrites might plausibly be repurposed to explore
an intricacy or implication of the new law or amendment. And given the
number of high court decisions that might be candidates for legislative
approval (not to mention the multiplier effect from lower court rulings),
the frequency of underwrites we have identified suggests that legislative
resources can be diverted from addressing entirely separate novel
problems that deserve policymakers' attention.
But while we recognize and credit the reality of such opportunity
costs, we are not persuaded that underwriting is displacing our
legislatures' ability to solve the nation's core challenges. Statutes that
underwrite court rulings, like statutes that reauthorize ongoing programs
or that appropriate funds to existing agencies, are part of the legislative
maintenance functions that coexist with laws responding ab initio to
newly prioritized policy challenges. As a conserving element alongside
more innovative efforts, underwrites can be understood as contributing
to the warp and woof of lawmaking stability. Moreover, underwrites as
we define them are tied to textual enactments. We have already excluded
from our conception of underwriting any legislative history "in the
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air"-untethered to enacted legislation-as an irrelevant expenditure of
legislative resources.
A distinct opportunity cost is the possibility that underwrites,
especially of lower court decisions, will derogate from the functions of
the highest court because legislatures will usurp the high court's
jurisdictional terrain in resolving lower court conflicts. We have several
responses to this concern-and we focus on the federal system here to
make our point, though mutatis mutandis the same points could be made
at the state level. In pragmatic terms, the Supreme Court currently
resolves only a fraction of all circuit court conflicts. 91 As the Court's
docket has shrunk by more than half since the mid-1980s, 92 there is no
reason to anticipate that Congress addressing more lower court conflicts
will inflict meaningful damage on the Court's domain. Further, at a
doctrinal level there may well be circuit conflicts in areas of law where
private parties invest a high level of reliance-think of securities law,
bankruptcy law, or intellectual property law. Waiting for a fully mature
and percolated circuit conflict on such matters may cause more damage
to reliance interests than if Congress steps in and picks a winner, with a
suitably clear explanation. Finally, the institutional tradeoff of allowing
the most democratically accountable branch to preempt the Supreme
Court in resolving certain nascent or evolving disagreements over
statutory meaning may actually enhance legitimacy within our legal
system, as we explain in Section II.B below. Rather than violating
conceptions of role fidelity by "stealing cases," a legislature that asserts
more control over judicial interpretations of its statutory product may be
seen as remaining invested in its democratic responsibility to author and
explicate a polity's laws.
91 See generally Evan Bernick, The Circuit Splits Are Out There-And the Court Should
Resolve Them, 16 Engage 36 (2015) (exploring unaddressed circuit splits); Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Remembering Justice White, 74 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1283, 1285 (2003)
(acknowledging that the Court might not always take up circuit splits unless they are deep or
have percolated for enough time).
92 See generally David R. Stras, The Supreme Court's Declining Plenary Docket: A
Membership-Based Explanation, 27 Const. Comment. 151 (2010) (analyzing potential
causes for the Court's shrinking docket); Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray,
The Supreme Court's Plenary Docket, 58 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 737 (2001) (same); Arthur
D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 403 (same).
Perusing basic Court statistics reveals that the shrunken docket pattern has continued until
the present day. See Statistics, Harv. L. Rev., https://harvardlawreview.org/category/
statistics/ [https://perma.cc/QA85-R2RN] (last visited Aug. 27, 2017).
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An additional challenge created by the presence of underwrites-or at
least by increased efforts to promote underwriting as a legislative
modality-is the enhanced prospect of policy-related conflict. If each
legislative session featured constant revisiting of old laws and their
interpretation in the courts, this could make matters feel less settled for
officials, administrators, judges, and citizens. A likely result might well
be increased conflict in society as a whole, the very opposite of what the
underwrite aspires to accomplish. High-profile attention to underwrites
may be especially conflict producing in today's polarized and gridlocked
legislative settings, 93 incentivizing manipulative behavior on both sides
of the aisle. Regular and conspicuous revisiting of important legislation
may also have downstream effects, making almost any effort to
harmonize judicial and legislative visions of a text's meaning subject to
partisan challenge. In an ironic twist, more attention to the very
possibility for explicit underwriting could lead to less underwriting.
We appreciate that heightened attention to underwriting as a
legislative function may contribute to its becoming more politicized. The
fact that underwrites signal agreement with the judiciary and consensus
between the branches could serve to make legislators less vigilant or
cautious about what precisely they are endorsing as an interbranch
consensus. In addition, well under half of all legislators are trained as
lawyers,94 and fewer still have experience with court decisions as
litigators. If underwrites garner more legislative attention, this may
93 See generally Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of
Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 273 (2011) (exploring the causes
of severe polarization in modem politics). It is worth noting that gridlock is a function not
only of polarization, but also of divided government. See Sarah A. Binder, Stalemate:
Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock 4-10 (2003); Sarah A. Binder, The
Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96, 93 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 519, 527 (1999). We
have entered a period of united government in Washington, which may alleviate gridlock in
the federal legislative process, even though we remain highly polarized as a nation. And it
may be that we see lots of state-level underwriting even in periods of polarization because
there is less gridlock within state legislatures.
94 The number of lawyers in the state legislatures is about fourteen percent, and the
number of lawyers in Congress is below forty percent, down from about eighty percent in the
mid-nineteenth century. See Karl Kurtz, Who We Elect: The Demographics of State
Legislatures, Nat'l Conf. St. Legislatures (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
about-state-legislatures/who-we-elect.aspx [https://perma.cc/B3W3-V9DL]; Debra Cassens
Weiss, Lawyers No Longer Dominate Congress; Is Commercialization of Profession to
Blame?, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 20, 2016, 8:06 AM), http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/
lawyers no longer dominate congress is commercialization of profession to b [https://
perma.cc/76K5-KC8L].
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inadvertently contribute to policy-related confusion given legislators'
often rudimentary understandings of the judicial holdings and reasoning
they are asked to approve. Legislatures also may not fully understand or
anticipate the implications of what they are doing when they are
underwriting. Cases do not come briefed with a clear guide as to what is
holding and what is dicta, and the art of citing and quoting from cases to
signal agreement can sometimes sow confusion for legal audiences. 95
95 An interesting example here may come from the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights
Act of 1965. In a famous modification of the voting rights regime in 1982, Congress
simultaneously overrode City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), which had purported
to require plaintiffs in voting rights claims to show that a practice or procedure was enacted
or maintained at least in part for an invidious purpose, and underwrote White v. Regester,
412 U.S. 755 (1973), which had allowed plaintiffs to make out their claims through a
showing of discriminatory results. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 2 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 179 ("S. 1992 amends Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
to prohibit any voting practice, or procedure [that] results in discrimination. This amendment
is designed to make clear that proof of discriminatory intent is not required to establish a
violation of Section 2. It thereby restores the legal standards, based on the controlling
Supreme Court precedents, which applied in voting discrimination claims prior to the
litigation involved in Mobile v. Bolden. The amendment also adds a new subsection to
Section 2 which delineates the legal standards under the results test by codifying the leading
pre-Bolden vote dilution case, White v. Regester." (footnote omitted)); id. at 67, reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 246 ("New Subsection 2(b) delineates the legal analysis which the
Congress intends courts to apply under the 'results test.' Specifically the subsection codifies
the test for discriminatory result laid down by the Supreme Court in White v. Regester, and
the language is taken directly from that decision. 412 U.S. 755 at 766, 769."); accord H. Rep.
No. 97-227, at 2, 28-30, 43, 71-72 (1981) (self-consciously rejecting Bolden and endorsing
White). But during the underwrite, Congress, while quoting the White standard, changed a
word from White in the text of the statute without careful explanation. The Court decision
gives minorities the right "to elect legislators of their choice," White, 412 U.S. at 766
(emphasis added), while the statute gives minorities the right "to elect representatives of
their choice," 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2012) (emphasis added). This "imperfect" underwrite
gave rise to a subsequent case about whether the statute covers only legislators or also
judges. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) (holding, by a 6-3 vote and over
vigorous dissent from Justice Scalia, that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act applies to judicial
elections). Irrespective of what the Court ultimately did with the signal from Congress about
its endorsement of White (and recognizing that both White and Bolden involved
constitutional dimensions), this example serves to highlight a real cost of underwriting
practices that seem explicit and carefully considered but can also be confusing for
downstream interpreters.
All that said, it is important to understand the core benefit of the underwriting-overriding
hybrid here that might serve to counterbalance the costs of imperfect articulation. The Court
after the 1982 amendments was given an absolutely clear signal that Bolden contained the
wrong kind of analysis for developing statutory voting rights and that White's discriminatory
results approach was the generally preferable one going forward. Although Congress drew
from constitutional law in doing its underwriting work and failed to anticipate every question
about the applicability of the 1982 amendments that was to come, it was unmistakable in
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At the same time, legislators are advised by attorneys at numerous
levels--on their committees, in their personal offices, and through the
chamber's legislative counsel. These legal staffers are responsible for
providing members with guidance on relevant judicial developments.
Lawyered participation on both sides of the aisle should reduce the
prospects for stealth underwrites or related political manipulations.
Moreover, even with heightened attention to underwrites, strategic
insertions of endorsement of judicial decisions should be less likely to
occur than furtive efforts to inject overrides, given that the endorsed
judicial decisions at issue will presumptively remain applicable under
stare decisis. We do not wish to minimize the possibilities for
unanticipated confusion or strategic mischief. But in the end, this is
essentially a plea that underwriting be done well and carefully rather
than haphazardly and/or on the sly.
Of course, the legislative process is already quite politicized and
susceptible to manipulation. It is not obvious that underwrites, premised
on law and policy agreement between two branches of government, will
add substantially to that witches' brew. As is true with renewal of
appropriations measures and reauthorizations, laws building on the
status quo may be less politicized than new policymaking proposals,
although they may nonetheless give rise to partisan disagreements as a
function of the legislature's composition and climate.
Further, the politicization that is part of court-legislative exchange is
hardly limited to the legislature. As Justice Stevens's dissent in West
Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey suggests,96 Supreme Court efforts
at statutory interpretation may at times be inconsistent with the faithful
servant norm linked to legislative supremacy. The saga of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 (overriding many Supreme Court decisions, almost
which direction the legislature wanted the courts to go in their statutory interpretation work.
Even those skeptical of the substance of the underwriting conceded that the basic thrust of
the underwrite was hard to deny. See S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 104 n.24 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 277 n.24 (Additional Views of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch of Utah) ("The
Committee Report could not be more explicit in its adoption of the standard of the Supreme
Court in White v. Regester.").
Because White was not a Voting Rights Act case and arose under the Constitution rather
than statutory law, this example is not squarely within our "statutory underwriting" category.
Still, it usefully demonstrates a cost we flag in the text that could easily arise in a purer
statutory underwriting environment.
96 See 499 U.S. 83, 113-14 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoted in relevant part supra
note 4).
2017] 1517
1518 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 103:1487
all decided between 1986 and 1991) 9 7 and the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act of 1990 (overriding the Court for the second time with
respect to the meaning of the same statutory term)98 indicate that judicial
mischief can exacerbate the prospects for policy-related conflicts on an
interinstitutional level, thereby detracting from the communicative and
stabilizing role of lawmaking. That this occurs more than occasionally
with respect to overrides99 suggests it will probably take place if
underwrites receive heightened attention. Still, judicial undermining of
the faithful agent norm may be more likely to occur when the legislature
is rejecting a court's interpretation than when it is embracing one.
There are also related doctrinal consequences to consider-some of
which we take up in more detail in Part III. The core doctrinal risk is
97 See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1492-93 (listing twelve Supreme Court
decisions, nine of which were decided between 1986 and 1991, that were overridden by the
1991 Civil Rights Act).
98 Brudney, supra note 9, at 11-20 (describing a multistage process, whereby Congress in
1978 overrode a 1977 Court decision construing certain language in the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, the Court in a 1989 decision reiterated portions of its earlier decision on
grounds that Congress had rejected its holding but not all of its reasoning, and Congress in
1990 then overrode the Court's 1989 decision as well; and explicating how the 1990
congressional phase of this judicially inspired interbranch exchange carried sizable
opportunity costs for Congress).
99 See generally Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 5, at 531-34, 551-56 (describing
the ways in which courts limit the scope or application of overrides); Widiss, Hydra
Problem, supra note 5, at 881-900 (describing how the Supreme Court in Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), construed an override of its earlier Title VII
decision as a quasi-underwrite of that decision for other similarly worded but not
subsequently amended texts).
Apart from the judicial undermining identified in Gross, it seems possible that overrides
may be inadvertently undermined in part by Congress. For example, in the 1991 Civil Rights
Act, Congress overrode the Court's refusal, earlier that same year, to endorse expert-witness
fee reimbursement in a civil rights lawsuit, pursuant to the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2012); Casey, 499 U.S. at 88, 97; H.R. Rep. No.
102-40, pt. 1, at 78-79 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 616-17. In doing so,
Congress may have unintentionally given legs to a different portion of Casey, which had
suggested that a 1987 Court decision (Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S.
437 (1987)) set forth a general rule of limitation on expert-witness fee-shifting. See 499 U.S.
at 86; H.R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 78-79, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 616-17.
This implied ratification may survive even though aspects of the legislative history to the
1991 Civil Rights Act signal that Crawford Fitting itself was deemed suspect as a general
rule. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 30, 53 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
694, 723, 738-39; 137 Cong. Rec. 30668 (Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of House Floor Manager
Rep. Ford). We are grateful to Professor Peter Strauss for bringing this example to our
attention.
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that, although we may hope that making plain the possibility of explicit
underwriting will help put other implications from legislative silence in
their proper place in the panoply of reasoning from "post-enactment
legislative signals,"' 00 there is still a danger that courts will end up using
more silence and inaction to derive meanings: in particular, the inaction
of failing to underwrite. This would be a cost to the enterprise of
statutory interpretation because the absence of an agreement to
underwrite should not be freighted with any special meaning. To be
sure, we are hopeful that the canons of acquiescence would be better
understood and applied as more underwriting comes to light. Yet there is
clearly some possibility that underwrites would look so attractive for
implicature within statutory interpretation that enthusiastic courts might
go too far and start reasoning from the absence of an underwrite. Courts
might even discount stare decisis, thinking they have implied license to
revisit statutory precedents where legislatures have not expressed
explicit approval. Much as an underwrite can seem like it is capable of
"super-charging" precedent, there is a worry that the lack of an
underwrite can undermine stare decisis more generally. That would be a
serious cost, and one that risks exacerbation as underwriting becomes
more salient and more common.
Finally, on a less pragmatic yet still important level, there is a risk to
overplaying the concept of legislative supremacy.' 01 Although the idea
of interbranch dialogue seems inspired by "The Legal Process" made
famous by Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks,10 2 an unduly rigid
conception of legislative supremacy trades on a very nonlegal process
vision that "the law" comes from just one kind of speaker. This mode of
thinking is more tied to a civil law approach, not the common law
perspective prevalent in the United States, where lawyers are used to
100 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Post-Enactment Legislative Signals, 57 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 75, 76 (1994).
101 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 Geo. L.J.
319 (1989) (defending dynamic interpretation and interbranch dialogue notwithstanding
legislative supremacy); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative
Supremacy, 78 Geo. L.J. 281 (1989) (evaluating the implications of legislative supremacy in
nonconstitutional areas of public policymaking).
102 See, e.g., Hart & Sacks, supra note 14, at 774-92 ("Problem No. 27. Interstitial
Correction of Decisional Doctrines of General Application"); id. at 810-44 ("Problem No.
29. Revision of Judicial Interpretation of an Existing Statute"). In our forthcoming paper on
interbranch dialogue, we draw out the legal process etiology more explicitly. See Brudney &
Leib, supra note 2, at Part III.
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judicial development of policy over time. 103 Beyond this potential lack
of familiarity to our common law tradition, an undue assertion of
legislative supremacy risks derogating from the dialogue itself. If one
institution is always master and one always subordinate, this can have a
negative effect on the productivity of the dialogue.' °4
Admittedly, these kinds of costs associated with "too much"
underwriting are speculative, and judges are used to being supreme in
other conversations, notably exchanges about constitutional law.
Nonetheless, it can be an unusual sort of supremacy in which a
legislature endorses the authority of another branch, using the other
branch's words and grammar. In that regard, Senator Orrin Hatch once
usefully reminded Congress that when it speaks by embracing case law,
it may actually be derogating from its own authority rather than
reasserting it if it is not careful to specify exactly what it hopes to
accomplish in its underwriting.' °5 Such concerns should not be wholly
discounted, and any recommendation for making salient and more
common the practice of underwriting should be calibrated with this cost,
among others, in view.
B. Benefits
Although one might think that legislatures have better uses for their
time than identifying judicial decisions of which they approve, we have
103For more on how the United States is really a hybrid common law-civil law
jurisdiction, see generally Thomas H. Lee, Civil Law's Influence on American
Constitutionalism, N.Y.U. L. (unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/
default/files/upload documents/Lee%2OCivil%2OLaw%20Tradition%20NYU%20Final%20
Draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YA4-5Z6A] (last visited Sept. 3, 2017).
104 On the need for co-equal participants to make the interbranch dialogue work well, see
generally Jeremy Waldron, Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and Legislators, 23
Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 7 (2004).
105 See S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 104 n.24 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 277
n.24 (Additional Views of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch of Utah) ("[T]he Committee has chosen to
adopt language with a history-language that has already been suffused with some meaning
by the Court-rather than venture with language that was capable of standing on its own and
being interpreted de novo. To the extent that they have explicitly anchored this language to
White [v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973)]-and that point is far clearer in the Committee
debates on this issue than even in the Committee Report--courts are obliged to recognize
this and to appreciate that Congress (for better or worse) chose to incorporate the case law of
White-all of its case law-in rendering meaning to the new statutory language. Given the
Committee's decision to define the new test in terms of White, the Committee Report
ironically is reduced substantially in importance.").
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identified several clusters of reasons supporting the practice of regular
underwriting. Indeed, taken together, these benefits might recommend
even more underwriting in the right contexts.
The first cluster involves the abiding value of interbranch
communication. Given that so much of the practice of statutory
interpretation relies on the possibility of legislative-judicial dialogue, it
would seem useful for there to be better communication between the
branches, leading ultimately to more rational policy development over
time. 106 As legislatures take the opportunity to focus on how their
enacted laws are being implemented, they can help to refine interpretive
efforts in the courts. Through a process of revisiting and honing
legislative work product, courts can more responsibly approximate
democratic preferences even as they continue to receive input from
officials whose jobs are to study the consequences of various regulatory
legal regimes. Thus, not only can our laws better track policy choices
being made by representatives elected to set policy, but also those laws
can benefit from ongoing deliberation by judges and legislators outside
the narrow litigation context.
There are at least two cash-outs that can flow from this sharpening of
interbranch communication. One is the added value of underwritten
lower court decisions as direction to other courts. Because, as we have
suggested, very few statutory conflicts reach the Supreme Court or a
state's highest court,1°7 underwriting a lower court decision when the
legislature concludes a court "got it right" is a way for a legislature to
minimize the development, or prevent the continuation, of lower court
conflicts. By foreclosing contrary lower court understandings, an
underwrite communicates clearly to the judicial branch on a matter
squarely within the legislative bailiwick. At the federal level, this
preclusion of further lower court conflicts may be especially valued in
subject areas like securities and copyright, where uncertainty can be
unusually costly to both regulated entities and regulators.
106 See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1414 ("[O]ften overrides clarified
confusing rules and standards created by the Supreme Court and replaced the Court's
holdings with clearer legal regimes."). The authors' favorite example is the override of FDA
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), in which Congress provided an
"artful" and "efficient" solution that would have been unlikely to come from the agency if
the Court had permitted the FDA to assert its jurisdiction over tobacco. See Christiansen &
Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1454.
107 See sources cited supra notes 91-92.
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Another cash-out is to resolve issues arising from agency
nonacquiescence, the practice of executive branch officials refusing to
extend law made by regional court of appeals panels. This problem
arises on the federal stage because Congress assigns agencies to
implement national policy through the uniform administration of its
authorizing statutes, but agencies may sometimes decline to adopt
regional courts of appeals decisions as properly implementing that
national policy or direction.'l8  Some scholars have criticized
nonacquiescence as upsetting the balance between agencies and courts
by depriving courts of the power to enforce congressional limitations on
agency conduct until the Supreme Court enters the fray, which can often
take a very long time. 10 9 Both the agency and the lower courts act in the
belief that they are respecting and reflecting Congress's will and
purposes. Underwrites offer a means of escaping this interbranch
conundrum by restoring legislative supremacy as expressed through
appropriately precise and elaborated text and legislative history. l l
Mutatis mutandis, intrastate dynamics can mirror these institutional
complexities.
A second cluster of benefits leverages legal stability: underwriting
can facilitate continued reliance on precedent by courts, agencies, and
actors in civil society. This can be important so that courts do not
backpedal, agencies continue to receive useful information about how
the statutes they implement should be applied and developed, and
private actors feel comfortable making investments in their operations
with more confidence that today's interpretation of statutes will be close
to tomorrow's. Admittedly, court-driven common law ultimately is more
pliable and may pose a bigger business risk in this respect, given that the
likelihood of a legislature passing comprehensive legislation reversing
course is generally small. Nonetheless, more regular underwriting can
108 See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 98 Yale L.J. 679, 692-718 (1989) (reporting that the Social
Security Administration and the National Labor Relations Board are regular practitioners of
nonacquiescence).
109 See Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the
Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 Yale L.J. 801, 803
(1990).
110 This ancillary benefit also reflects that, while we have chosen not to address legislative
underwrites of agency interpretations, underwrites of judicial interpretations can have a
meaningful if indirect effect on agency choices and priorities.
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serve to mitigate the costs associated with the legal uncertainty wrought
by statutory law.
Consider in this regard our New York election law example above."'
There was a real risk of backpedaling from a plausible, but not required,
reading of the election code in just those cases where a modified
decision could swing a close election. In foreclosing possibilities for
future partisan meddling in election results by a motivated judiciary, the
New York legislature provided a sensible underwrite to the Court of
Appeals decision that stabilized the law in an area where stability is
central to democratic functioning.
A third cluster involves the development of a more nuanced
interpretive hierarchy. Once the practice of underwriting is exposed and
utilized as a more regular feature of the legislative process, the
continued use of tea-leaf reading from legislative inaction and legislative
acquiescence should become less prevalent. Reasoning about what a
legislature wants by looking at what it doesn't do, what decisions it
doesn't override, and what steps it doesn't take to fix the development of
the law is both common in the courts and regularly criticized by
commentators. 112 But as courts become increasingly aware of how
legislatures signify their approval in more affirmative ways through
underwrites, judges might be increasingly motivated to discount the
sounds of silence as dispositive or even highly probative signals. Put
differently, the more underwriting looks like a real option for
legislatures, the less courts will have to rely on fictions to approximate
intent over time. This is not to conclude that the "silence" and
"acquiescence" canons of statutory interpretation should play no role in
the enterprise (and that argument doesn't follow from anything we say
here); only that underwriting helps make plainer a hierarchy of forms of
legislative endorsement. As we suggested above, there is a possible cost
that silence may become even more salient in negative terms. Still, with
careful emphasis that the lack of an underwrite is not a signal of
anything doctrinally, we feel cautiously optimistic that bringing
underwriting practices to light is more likely to reset an interpretive
hierarchy than it is to further confuse it.
A fourth benefit we can associate with more visible underwriting
might be more meaningful overriding. With an increase in the frequency
11 See supra text accompanying notes 72-78.
112 See sources cited supra note 9. We take up this theme directly in Part III.
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of these exchanges, legislatures are more likely to see it as their business
to guide interpretation of their statutes and make more frequent
investments in their upkeep. This development should engender greater
legislative attention and care in providing useful interventions through
both underwriting and overriding. Overriding is "the primary means
through which [legislatures] signal[] disagreement with judicial
interpretations of statutes. 113 And as interbranch interaction becomes
regularized and perhaps even routinized, courts will be less often stuck
guessing just what an override means. Thus, underwriting signals along
with overrides can help delineate the scope of the overrides, enabling
courts to identify more precisely their reach and their contours. With
concern about the way "shadow precedent"-precedent that reasonably
should have been overturned by an override-continues to be followed
by courts even after overrides,"' increased attention to explicit
underwrites in the text of statutes and in their suitably reliable legislative
histories will help instruct courts on how to hear what legislatures exert
energy to say. This makes even more sense once courts come to
appreciate the "diversity of interests represented and the level of public
participation in th[e] process" of overriding." 5
Finally, and perhaps most abstractly, there is likely a legitimacy
enhancement within our legal system when interpretive decisions are
revisited by legislators, who get to reassert their ownership over the
meaning of the policies that control our democracy. In part, it may
conduce to sociological legitimacy for citizens to be able to look up the
laws that control them without having to parse too many opinions of
judges throughout the judicial hierarchy, a "rule of law" benefit. In
addition, more normative legitimacy accrues to a democracy when
statutory law develops not merely through the common law process but
also through the regular interventions of elected legislators, who are
primarily responsible for the development of this statutory law. In
whatever sense the common law can be vindicated as consistent with the
ideals of deliberative democracy,1 16 expanding positive elaboration of
113 Widiss, Hydra Problem, supra note 5, at 860.
114 See generally Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 5 (describing and critiquing the
phenomenon of "shadow precedents").
115 Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1414; see also id. at 1419 (noting that the
legitimacy of overrides "rests upon the open, deliberative, and pluralist process by which
statutes are supposed to be enacted").
116 See Matthew Steilen, The Democratic Common Law, 2011 J. Juris. 437, 471-84.
1524 [Vol. 103:1487
Legislative Underwrites
statutory law to include legislatures as well as courts also seems to
conduce to higher aspirations of democratic access and deliberation.
C. Underwriting "As Applied"
Apart from understanding and assessing costs and benefits associated
with underwrites, there are certain "as applied" aspects of the practice
that may further illuminate the weight of these contesting arguments.
Although our ultimate conclusion is that underwrites are entitled to
respect by courts under most conditions, there are particular
vulnerabilities that can threaten to limit the legal efficacy of these clear
expressions of legislative approval. Below, we identify six caveats that
might cut against a simplistic view regarding the application of
legislative supremacy in the statutory domain.
1. Underwriting Trial Court Decisions
When a legislature seeks to underwrite a trial-court level decision,
there is a question about whether such a decision could have sufficient
generality or authority to bind all courts on a going-forward basis.
Justice Scalia gives expression to some of this concern in his concurring
opinion in Blanchard v. Bergeron: "Congress is elected to enact statutes
rather than point to cases, and its Members have better uses for their
time than poring over District Court opinions."'1 17 Although we do not
agree with Justice Scalia that a legislature is somehow wasting its time
studying cases to see if its statutes are being applied correctly, we can
understand the concern with extensive legislative studies of trial-level
cases in particular.
In Blanchard, Justice Scalia finds especially disconcerting the "role
reversal"' required by the underwrite in that case: the Supreme Court
was seemingly put in the position of parsing trial-level court cases for
guidance. From one perspective, it might seem unexceptional for a
legislature to find a few cases that represent its thinking, incorporate
them by reference, and expect future judges to follow this legislative
thinking to its logical conclusion. Yet from another, the "role reversal"
issue flagged by Justice Scalia does seem to challenge the internal
hierarchy of the judiciary such that it may be prudent for legislatures to
117 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
"' Id. at 97.
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focus their underwrites primarily on higher court opinions (supreme
courts and appellate courts) if they hope to be effective.
Such a focus also would parry the concern that members of
legislatures are not necessarily lawyers and are therefore less able to
understand trial-court opinions. Further, in contrast to federal and state
supreme court decisions, which are fewer in number and tend to receive
media coverage, decisions by lower-level courts, especially at the trial-
court level, are unlikely to be noticed by committee leaders, much less
by members outside the committees. This gives rise to the risk that
approval of a lower court decision reflects an exchange between
committee staff and an interested private group or agency official, rather
than broader awareness and appreciation from legislators. 1 9
We do not advocate limiting underwrites to decisions by a federal or
state supreme court. Moreover, when a statute is written in open-ended,
common law-type language, as was true for the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976,120 for example, the widespread acceptance by
lower courts of a certain approach may be an especially apt candidate for
legislative underwrite. Nonetheless, we note that lower-court
decisions-especially from trial courts-are more likely to have the
parties' lawyers as their relevant audiences, whereas appellate and
supreme court decisions are more likely to be authored with broader
audiences in mind. 121 And the latter are decisions that a legislature could
more easily become aware of and understand, rendering the underwrite
comprehensible to future statutory interpreters.
2. Underwrites Using Legislative History
Justice Scalia's problems with the underwrite in Blanchard were not
limited to Congress's pointing to district court opinions, of course; he
was also irritated that Congress did its underwriting in the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976122 in legislative history, with a
view toward further judicial interpretations. 123 As he wrote:
119 See Brudney, supra note 9, at 83-84.
12042 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012) (providing that "the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs").
121 See Lawrence Baum, Judges and Their Audiences: A Perspective on Judicial Behavior
170 (2006); Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 146 (2008).
122 Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641.
123Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 98-99.
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What a heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to know that his
or her citation of obscure district court cases can transform them into
the law of the land, thereafter dutifully to be observed by the Supreme
Court itself.
I decline to participate in this process. It is neither compatible with
our judicial responsibility of assuring reasoned, consistent, and
effective application of the statutes of the United States, nor conducive
to a genuine effectuation of congressional intent, to give legislative
force to each snippet of analysis, and even every case citation, in
committee reports that are increasingly unreliable evidence of what
the voting Members of Congress actually had in mind 12 4
Although we will not revisit here the perennial legislative history
debates, 125 we do not share Justice Scalia's blanket skepticism about the
value of a legislature's explanation of its purpose or intent in reliable
documents produced as an integral part of the legislative process--or
about courts' reliance on such documents in their own interpretation.
126
Still, in the proposed underwrite at issue in Blanchard, Justice Scalia
highlights that the district court opinions were cited by only one
chamber rather than both127-and the committee reports failed to
124 Id. at 99 (emphasis added).
125 Compare, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History,
1987 Duke L.J. 371, 375-79 (arguing against undue reliance on legislative history in light of
democratic theory and other practical concerns), with Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge
Starr's Observations, 1987 Duke L.J. 380, 382-85 (maintaining that "the use of legislative
history is compelled by the inherent ambiguities of statutes"); Kavanaugh, supra note 20, at
2149-50 (suggesting that some judges may have a perverse incentive to find textual
ambiguities as an excuse to rely on favorable legislative history), with Robert A. Katzmann,
Judging Statutes 9-10 (2014) (positing that judicial respect for legislative history makes
courts more likely to interpret laws in a manner consistent with legislative purposes and
increases the prospects that Congress will perceive federal courts as productive partners in
the lawmaking enterprise).
126 See Brudney, supra note 9, at 70-86 (discussing modalities of reliable legislative
history); see also Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges Disdain
Political History?, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 242 (1998) (arguing that using political history in
understanding statutes is required by constitutional structure).
127 Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 98. The House Committee Report does discuss the Fifth Circuit
decision in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) (which
the district courts cited in the Senate Report had construed), and it makes clear that the
judicial remedy of attorney's fees must be "full and complete" in order for victims of civil
right violations to have effective access to court. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, at 1, 8 (1976).
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describe the significance and import of the cases they were citing,
128
leaving the Court to do the complicated work of "separating holding
from dictum."'1
29
For an underwrite based on legislative history to deserve its rightful
place, we would generally agree that both cameral entities (where
relevant) should evidence their intent to underwrite; they also need to
explain themselves well enough that the judiciary is not left at sea with
little more than a string cite. Otherwise, there is the ironic risk of an
increase in judicial discretion (and perhaps judicial mischief) within a
practice that is supposed to be limiting judicial discretion through
important signals from the principal of all statutory product.1
30
3. Underwrites in Uncodified Portions of Enacted Laws
Another possible mode of attack against the kind of underwrite we
illustrate in Part I is that the specific provisions that execute the
underwrite often appear in preliminary material in statutes, such as
findings or purpose sections. No one doubts these provisions are enacted
law, so even formalists would have to treat them as having met the
recognized requirements of lawmaking (in contrast to the formalist view
of legislative history). Yet, the Supreme Court at one point indicated that
these portions of enacted law-which do not always make their way
easily into the United States Code-may "not constitute an exertion of
the will of Congress which is legislation, but a recital of considerations
which in the opinion of that body existed and justified the expression of
its will in the [relevant] act."''
That said, the sections passed into law in our examples of underwrites
above are clearly substantive legislation, not mere "opinions." And the
placement of the underwrite in a findings or purpose section is not mere
interpretive guidance with courts as the only audience, but is a
substantive piece of legislative will that should be treated as such. It is
12 8Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 98-99.
129 Id. at 97.
130 When overrides are ambiguous or imprecise, they too can have this perverse effect. See
generally Widiss, Hydra Problem, supra note 5, at 861 (highlighting that the interpretation of
overrides can serve to increase judicial discretion when the override's function is largely to
"check... judicial lawmaking").
131 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 290 (1936) (discussing the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 991, § 1 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 801-02 (Supp. II
1936))).
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useful to remember that when the Court issued its skeptical remark
about congressional recitals, it was most likely protecting its
prerogatives in the domain of constitutional law (where judicial rather
than legislative supremacy is the default norm). The statute at issue in
that case was declared to be an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's
powers, so Congress's own opinion about the statute's constitutionality
could not be taken by the Court to be dispositive.13 2
Accordingly, we do not think there is any conceptual difficulty with
placing statutory underwrites within prefatory material in statutory
drafting. Still, legislatures may want to be clear that, in findings or
purposes sections that include underwrites, they are expressing their will
about the meaning of a newly enacted provision rather than their opinion
about its constitutionality. This may also make it more likely that those
responsible for translating public laws into the U.S. Code will situate the
underwrite in an accessible form for courts to see, cite, and respect. No
matter how the session laws ultimately get inserted into relevant
published codes, when a legislature embraces a statutory decision (rather
than a constitutional decision), the courts should never forget it is a
statute they are expounding, subject to the fundamental principle of
legislative supremacy.
4. Intended Audiences and Underwriting
Different statutes are directed to different audiences, and underwriting
practices must remain sensitive to these differences. Many statutes aim
to control subjects' primary conduct, while some statutes seek to guide
courts or other governmental actors.1 33 As a general matter, to the extent
legislatures aim to be as clear as possible to citizens and residents about
how to conform their conduct to law-using underwrites and other
available means of clarification about a law's meaning-it seems
reasonable to expect that courts should heed a legislature's guidance.
Yet there are classes of laws-rules of procedure and evidence strike us
132 The case was decided right before the Court finally bought into the New Deal and its
expansive understanding of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. In the statute
at issue in Carter, Congress had used its findings to emphasize that regulating the coal
industry was in the "national public interest"-and that it "directly affect[s] ... interstate
commerce." 49 Stat. 991-92, § 1 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 801-02 (Supp. 111936)).
133 See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 27-49 (2d ed. 1994); Meir Dan-Cohen,
Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L.
Rev. 625 (1984).
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as the most obvious-where an underwrite might have less purchase
because judges may plausibly believe that they have a better
understanding of how the rules of the courtroom do and should operate
on a day-to-day basis. In this regard, it is unsurprising that enactment
procedures for the Federal Rules feature intimate court involvement, and
there is ample debate among scholars about whether the Federal Rules
ought to have a sui generis interpretive regime. 3 4 Precisely because
there is reason to doubt legislative supremacy here, underwriting of
judicial decisions about internal workings of the court system might
have less force. A court's sense of its supervisory control over the rules
of engagement within its chambers could justify discounting, if not
ignoring, what the court takes to be interstitial meddling with its affairs.
5. Underwrites Based on Constitutional Avoidance
There is at least one other form of underwrite that could challenge the
obviousness of legislative supremacy. Imagine a statutory decision by a
high court that is inflected with constitutional concerns. The court reads
a fair housing statute prohibiting religious discrimination in the "sale or
rental of a dwelling" as not extending to rental arrangements among
roommates within an apartment. The decision construes "dwelling" to
cover an apartment as a whole-rather than shared living arrangements
within its subparts-not primarily because the court is confident that this
is what the legislature meant or intended, but rather to avoid interfering
with intimate or private relationships, such as a decision by Muslim,
Jewish, or Christian roommates to live with others of their own religious
faith.135 If the legislature then underwrites that decision to exclude from
its coverage all single-unit roommate arrangements, one might think a
court should give respect to the statutory ratification the next time the
issue arises.
But if the predicate constitutional law evolves, it may be less than
obvious that the underwrite is legally effective. Thus, to continue with
our hypothetical, assume the same higher court in a subsequent case
134 See, e.g., Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, Civil Rules Interpretive Theory, 101
Minn. L. Rev. 2167 (2017); Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, Institutional
Competence and Civil Rules Interpretation, 101 Cornell L. Rev. Online 64 (2016); Elizabeth
G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 123 (2015).
135 See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council v. Roomate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216, 1220-22 (9th Cir.
2012).
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becomes concerned about possibly unconstitutional forms of exclusion
of newcomers (based on religion or national origin) by roommates in
impersonal rental arrangements, where inhabitants stay short periods and
there are five or six roommate changes per year.136 The court might then
decide to modify the statutory meaning of "dwelling" to cover these
more commercialized roommate settings. In short, there are domains of
statutory interpretation that may be shaped or driven by constitutional
law. In such contexts, legislative supremacy can sometimes reasonably
take a back seat to the judicial supremacy common within constitutional
law. Although this is not the place to explore whether judicial
supremacy is the right posture for all constitutional law, we simply note
that underwrites that veer close to areas of constitutional law are more
likely to see resistance from within the judiciary.
6. Underwrites and Ripple Effects
With all of these caveats, what then of the unexceptional view that,
when a legislature agrees that the judicial branch got an interpretive
decision correct, the courts ought to stay the course and respect their
own precedent rather than backpedal from it? It is hard to argue with this
proposition. Even if the legislature is only explicitly and clearly
endorsing an appellate court decision before the issue reaches the
highest court, the legislature is king in the world of statutory law, and it
needs to be respected throughout the judicial hierarchy, however
awkward it may be for a highest court to feel bound by an intermediate
appellate court that has been underwritten by the courts' real boss, the
legislature.
Still, as with legislative overrides, there is likely to be what Professor
Deborah Widiss has called the "hydra problem": when a legislature says
something specific about developing case law in one statute, it may
"permit the rapid growth of new 'heads' in numerous other statutes." 137
136 See Elizabeth A. Harris, A Pocket of Manhattan Where No One Stays for Long, N.Y.
Times (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/26/nyregion/in-new-york-
fmancial-district-is-a-pocket-of-transience.html?ref=nyregion&r-O (reporting on New York
City financial district apartments with high level of roommate turnover among childless
young professionals).
137 Widiss, Hydra Problem, supra note 5, at 863. Professor Widiss's "hydra" model does
not exactly translate to the underwrite context because the original "severing of a head"
makes more sense as a metaphor for an override. Id. Still, because an underwrite stunts
growth in one area, we can use the hydra model to highlight similar potential dynamics that
could occur in the underwrite domain.
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For instance, imagine a scenario in which a legislature underwrites a
high court decision to embrace a "disparate impact" claim of
discrimination under a core civil rights statute, which did not make
absolutely clear that such claims are legally viable. Then imagine that
the high court is presented with a disparate impact claim of
discrimination under a different, though related, antidiscrimination
statute with slightly different wording from the core civil rights
statute.138 The "hydra problem" here would be an assumption that,
because the legislature took the time to underwrite the disparate impact
theory for the core statute, it is reasonable to draw a negative inference
regarding the disparate impact claim's viability in the other statute. We
would agree with Widiss that this kind of reasoning is neither required
by logic nor is it respectful of the way legislatures work.
139
Accordingly, it is important for underwrites to be respected for all
they mean for the statutes to which they pertain but not to be the basis
for negative inferences about statutory law elsewhere. We would not
necessarily go where Widiss does in the override context: she proposes
"a rebuttable presumption that enactment of an override calls for the
(re)interpretation of... analogous provisions in related statutes., 140 At
the same time, we share her concerns when it comes to the dangers of
negative inferences associated with underwrites.
138 This is a simplification of a story one could tell about the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and litigation under the Fair Housing Act of 1968. See Tex.
Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015)
(holding that disparate impact claims are viable under the Fair Housing Act). The case does
not actually invoke the "hydra problem" in the way we suggest in the text, but it could have.
In the real case, the Court found that Congress "ratified" the disparate impact theory (that
was utilized in courts of appeals cases) through 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act.
See id. at 2521, 2525. The proposed ratification would not have amounted to an underwrite
in our terms; rather, it was asserted under a theory of implied endorsement through
legislative silence. See id. at 2520 ("'If a word or phrase has been... given a uniform
interpretation by inferior courts ... , a later version of that act perpetuating the wording is
presumed to carry forward that interpretation.' A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 322 (2012); see also Forest Grove School Dist. v. TA., 557
U.S. 230, 244, n.11 ... (2009) ('When Congress amended [the Act] without altering the text
of [the relevant provision], it implicitly adopted [this Court's] construction of the statute');
Manhattan Properties, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U.S. 320, 336... (1934) (explaining,
where the courts of appeals had reached a consensus interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act
and Congress had amended the Act without changing the relevant provision, '[t]his is
persuasive that the construction adopted by the [lower federal] courts has been acceptable to
the legislative arm of the government')." (alterations in original)).
139 See Widiss, Hydra Problem, supra note 5, at 863-64.
140 Id. at 864-65.
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It is hard to say as a matter of pure theory whether a legislature's
negating versus endorsing a court decision-overrides or underwrites-
would generally be intended to have the more substantial ripple effect
outside the core area of a focused legislative intervention. One could
argue that an endorsement is more likely portable outside the core into
the periphery because the political capital needed to enact a ratification
might reside in a more consensual group, whereas the political economy
that animates a typical override might require cobbling together a
potentially more fragile coalition. Under such a view, the underwrite
should be "contagious," as it were, in statutory interpretation, whereas
the override should be narrowly construed.
On the other hand, one might suggest that an underwrite is cheap talk
because it looks like a form of passing the buck and putting a decision
on a different branch, whereas the override is throwing down the
gauntlet and taking democratic responsibility for results. Under that
view, the underwrite is the thing that should be narrowly interpreted and
the override-precisely because it is hard to accomplish-should be
expansively construed as an achievement of democratic capital.
We think there is no clear answer as to which of these views is right
in the general case. Different areas of law may have different dynamics
that would need to be considered. For example, overrides in criminal
law 4 1 and underwrites in tax 142 seem especially easy for legislatures to
accomplish. The political economy of particular areas of law probably
needs to figure into the question of just how broadly any particular
underwrite deserves to spread from its core to its periphery.
We cannot perform that level of analysis here. Beyond the general
claim that underwrites should be respected at least narrowly and that
negative inferences about other laws seem generally inappropriate,
whether an underwrite should spread to cognate areas of law is a
judgment call, requiring more fmne-grained discussion about the socio-
legal and political dynamics within any legislative subfield. Given these
realities, we suggest that courts pay close attention to deliberative
expressions of legislative purpose or intent contained within or
accompanying such underwrites. They should take additional notice if a
14 See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1361 (finding that overrides occur most
frequently when the government loses criminal law cases).
142 See Staudt et al., supra note 10, at 1352-55 (finding many underwrites in the tax area
because there is regular oversight by relevant congressional committees about what is going
on in the courts).
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cluster of underwrites and overrides in the same enactment can help
clarify the reach and ambit of portability.
III. INTEGRATING UNDERWRITES
Having concluded thus far that the practice of underwriting is more
common than previously understood and having suggested that (when
done carefully) the practice should be viewed as a net benefit to our
democracy, as well as our enterprise of statutory interpretation, this Part
describes how to integrate underwrites with certain longstanding and
influential interpretive doctrines. We suggest how underwrites comport
with general approaches to stare decisis in statutory cases (Section III.A)
and how to think about underwrites' relationship to the doctrines of
acquiescence common within statutory interpretation cases (Section
III.B). We then consider some particular circumstances where more-or
less-underwriting might be valuable (Section III.C), and we conclude
by identifying certain institutional mechanisms that might help to
routinize and spotlight underwrites (Section III.D).
A. Interplay with Stare Decisis
We cautioned earlier about courts assuming they could discount stare
decisis and revisit their past precedents when legislatures do not
underwrite previous court decisions. We do not intend to enter into the
scholarly debates about theoretical or practical justifications for
respecting precedent. 143 Instead, we accept that such respect is valuable
as a general matter, while also identifying certain exceptional situations
where courts may be more justified in departing from the precedent-
based meaning of statutes. Those exceptional situations, in turn, shed
light on when underwrites may be especially useful or appropriate.
Our interest here is in statutory stare decisis, consistent with our
initial focus on underwrites of statutory judicial decisions. Unlike
constitutional precedent, which is exceedingly difficult to modify
through the constitutional amendment process, statutory precedent
allows legislatures a reasonable opportunity to override or modify it. 144
143 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 Minn. L.
Rev. 1173 (2006); Maltz, supra note 9; Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law:
A Layered Approach, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (2012).
144 See Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 317, 322-27 (2005).
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Given that legislatures are primarily responsible for developing policy
through statutory law, parties advocating that a court abandon statutory
precedent when a legislature has not done so bear an especially heavy
burden.14 Legal scholars continue to debate the extent to which a
legislature's "reasonable opportunity" to alter judicial precedent should
carry close to conclusive weight or is overemphasized in this stare
decisis context. 146 For our purposes, we can accept as a starting point
that on the federal stage Congress has exercised its reasonable
opportunity with some frequency in response to Supreme Court statutory
decisions. 47 Accordingly, stare decisis regarding Supreme Court
precedent is presumptively quite robust. 1
48
There are at least three major justifications for why stare decisis in
this setting should carry substantial interpretive weight. 149 One involves
rule of law values. Respect for precedent reflects a commitment that
"bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities
of individuals."' 50 This commitment implicates related concepts of
judicial stability and neutrality. Subsequent judges must accord proper
141 See id. at 317. Because judges make all common law, they have more leeway to change
their own precedent. On the variability of the force of stare decisis among statutory,
constitutional, and common law cases, see, for example, Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,
285 U.S. 393, 405-10 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Brian C. Kalt, Three Levels of Stare
Decisis: Distinguishing Common-Law, Constitutional, and Statutory Cases, 8 Tex. Rev. L.
& Pol. 277, 277-78 (2004); Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 501, 540 (1948).
146 Compare Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an Absolute Rule
of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 177, 183 (1989) (arguing for conclusive
weight), with Hillel Y. Levin, A Reliance Approach to Precedent, 47 Ga. L. Rev 1035, 1052
(2013) (arguing that Congress cannot easily fix judicial errors in the modem context).
147 See generally Henschen, supra note 5, at 441-42 (citing examples from 1950s and
1960s); Eskridge, supra note 5, at 424-55 (citing examples from 1970s and 1980s);
Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1480-96 (citing examples from 1990s and 2000s).
148 It appears that conscious overrides in the federal context have declined somewhat since
the early 1990s at least in part due to partisan polarization and gridlock in Congress. See
Buatti & Hasen, supra note 5, at 265-66; Hasen, supra note 5, at 209. Still, as observed
above in note 93, we may be entering into a less gridlocked period at the federal level.
149 For relatively recent discussion and analysis of these justifications, see Barrett, supra
note 144; Farber, supra note 143, at 1176-84; Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62
Emory L.J. 1459 (2013); Levin, supra note 146; Waldron, supra note 143.
150 Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986).
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effect to their predecessors' decisions' 5 ' and-notwithstanding their
possibly different ideological proclivities-must be willing to live with
the standards set forth under these precedents. 15
2
A second justification involves values associated with reliance.
Legislatures may rely on judicial precedents when building on an
existing statutory scheme' or when developing new statutes in
analogous areas. Government agencies rely on existing precedent when
formulating or modifying rules and guidance that implement a statute.
The fabric of statutory law is thickened in these ways, and private
parties-both individuals and regulated entities-consistently rely on
the settled quality of judicial precedents to order their behavior. As
explained by Justice Scalia, a central objective of stare decisis is
"protecting the expectations of individuals and institutions that have
acted in reliance on existing rules.' 54
A third justification for stare decisis is more pragmatic, involving
institutional cost savings for the judiciary. As eloquently phrased by
then-Judge Benjamin Cardozo, "[T]he labor of judges would be
increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be
reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own course of
bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had
gone before him."' 55 By routinely and regularly adhering to precedent,
judges conserve their time and intellectual capital for new interpretive
challenges. 156 This substantial gain in judicial efficiency is especially
meaningful in the statutory setting, where complex legislative schemes
151 See Waldron, supra note 143, at 22-26, 31. See generally Kimble v. Marvel Entm't,
135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) (describing stare decisis as a doctrine that requires adherence
to precedent even if it "means sticking to some wrong decisions").
152 See Farber, supra note 143, at 1179.
153 This reliance element is one reason for the canon that repeals by implication are not
favored. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974); see also Smith v. Robinson, 468
U.S. 992, 1026 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (defending the canon "not only to avoid
misconstruction of the law effecting the putative repeal, but also to preserve the intent of
later Congresses that have already enacted laws that are dependent on the continued
applicability of the law whose implicit repeal is in question").
154Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 673 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment), overruled in part by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002).
155 Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (1921).
156 See Kozel, supra note 149, at 1467; Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External
Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 93, 102 (1989). In addition, stare
decisis "reduces incentives for challenging settled precedents, saving parties [as well as]
courts the expense of endless relitigation." Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409.
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enacted in stages or layers often require courts to build on their own
prior holdings and reasoning.
Yet, although respect for precedent creates a strong presumption of
doctrinal stability in statutory settings, that presumption is not
irrebuttable. Scholars have long recognized that stare decisis at the
Supreme Court level is less powerful in some circumstances than in
others. 157 The Court itself has observed that precedent may be worthy of
overruling if it is conceptually undermined by intervening changes in
legislative action or judicial conduct, inconsistent with our sense of
justice or with the social welfare, overly confusing, or a positive
detriment to coherence in the law.' These are broadly defined
categories inviting a certain amount of judicial discretion, but they make
clear that stare decisis has limits based on subsequent changes in the
law, conflict with important issues of national policy, or a severe lack of
workable application.15 9
In addition, the Court has been less respectful of stare decisis when
construing "common law statutes" such as the Sherman Act. As Justice
Kagan recently explained, "Congress ... intended that law's reference
to 'restraint of trade' to have 'changing content,' and authorized courts
to oversee the term's 'dynamic potential.' ' 160 Accordingly, the Court has
"felt relatively free to revise [its] legal analysis as economic
understanding evolves and ... to reverse antitrust precedents that
misperceived a practice's competitive consequences. 16' One further
ground for limiting the weight of doctrinal precedent involves decisions
that have not been heavily relied on by the government or private actors.
Such decisions may be of relatively recent vintage 162 or are perhaps
interpretations of a single statutory provision that is unconnected to a
157 See generally Hart & Sacks, supra note 14, at 1357 (describing situations where the
presumption may be overcome); Levin, supra note 146, at 1068-72, 1090-97 (identifying
categories of cases where stare decisis should be less powerful, discussing ways to weaken
the precedential value of "evil precedent," and describing how judges can assess the relative
strength of reliance interests that underlie support for precedent).
158 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173-74 (1989).
159 See id. (identifying five Supreme Court decisions between 1963 and 1973 that relied on
one or more of these grounds to overrule or modify a Supreme Court statutory precedent).
16'Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2412 (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S.
717, 731-32 (1988)).
161 Id. at 2412-13.
162 See, e.g., Boys Mkts. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 240-42 (1970).
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larger legislative scheme or that affects relatively few members of
society.
Apart from these doctrinally based limitations articulated with respect
to Supreme Court precedent, there are institutional reasons why stare
decisis may well carry less weight in other court settings. Congress is
generally aware of Supreme Court cases: they are few in number and
almost invariably attract media attention. Legislators thus have a
reasonable opportunity and incentive to override decisions with which
they strongly disagree. By contrast, the federal courts of appeals decide
tens of thousands of cases each year, the vast majority of which draw
little or no media coverage. 63 Congress can hardly be deemed to respect
these decisions as precedents when it lacks the time or resources to
know about more than a tiny fraction of them, much less to review them
for consistency with its own enacted laws.
Then too, Congress understands that appeals court interpretations can
be modified or reversed upon review by the Supreme Court and thus
may not be the ultimate judicial pronouncement on matters of statutory
meaning. As Professor Amy Coney Barrett observed, "The Supreme
Court can hope to elicit a congressional response because it has the last
word. The courts of appeals lack the ability to elicit a congressional
response because they do not. ' ' 164 Finally, while Supreme Court
decisions establish legal rules and precedents for the country as a whole,
circuit courts have a far more limited purchase on congressional actors.
Decisions establishing precedent in the Second Circuit or the Ninth
Circuit are unlikely to interest senators or representatives from the South
or Midwest. Accordingly, the chances are extremely slim that members
of Congress will feel obligated or even encouraged to support override
legislation for such appeals court decisions.
1 65
163 See, e.g., U.S. Courts of Appeals--Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pending, by
Circuit and Nature of Proceeding During the 12-Month Period Ending June 30, 2016, U.S.
Cts., http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data-tables/stfjb1_630.2016.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4B2R-6AXA] (last visited Sept. 26, 2017); U.S. Court of Appeals-Cases
Commenced, Terminated, and Pending, by Circuit and Nature of Proceeding During the 12-
Month Period Ending December 31, 2016, U.S. Cts., http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/datatables/stfj bl 1231.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KK6-7AEC] (last visited
Sept. 26, 2017).
164 Barrett, supra note 144, at 343.
165 See id. at 344; see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent, 81
U. Chi. L. Rev. 851, 877-78 (2014) (discussing risks of inferring congressional respect for
lower court precedent). There are exceptional settings in which circuit opinions reflect a
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A second institutional setting where stare decisis may be less
powerful involves elected state court judges. In contrast to Supreme
Court Justices, judges elected to state supreme courts must face the
voting public on a periodic basis.16 6 This alone engenders a heightened
political awareness and a consequent sensitivity to contemporary
electoral preferences or intensities that may subtly influence
consideration of past precedents. 16 7 In addition, state court judges tend to
be attuned to how state legislatures function, inasmuch as they move
between the branches professionally in ways that their modem federal
counterparts do not.168 This level of familiarity and understanding means
that elected state judges "are [well] positioned to use current legislative
preferences as interpretive inputs,"1 69 thereby softening the impact of
specialized area of expertise. Accordingly, Congress may be more likely to respond if it
disagrees with the results. See Barrett, supra note 144, at 345 n.151 (discussing the Second
Circuit on securities cases and the Federal Circuit on patent cases).
166 Judges are elected by the voters in twenty-two of the fifty state supreme courts, fifteen
via nonpartisan elections and seven via partisan election. See Methods of Judicial Selection,
Am. Judicature Soc'y, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial-selection/methods/selection_
ofjudges.cfn?state = [https://perma.cc/N25K-YJVV] (last visited Sept. 26, 2017); see also
Allen Lanstra, Jr., Does Judicial Selection Method Affect Volatility?: A Comparative Study
of Precedent Adherence in Elected State Supreme Courts and Appointed State Supreme
Courts, 31 Sw. U. L. Rev. 35, 40-44 (2001) (identifying twenty-one states where voters
elected supreme court judges as of 2000). The percentage of all state trial and appellate
judges who stand for election of some type is even higher-more than eighty percent. See
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Speech: The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 973, 976
(2001). Counting the "merit" systems (in which a judge is first seated through appointment
but is retained through election), forty states have elective judiciaries. See generally Jed
Handelsman Shugerman, The People's Courts: Pursuing Judicial Independence in America
296 n.22, 366 nn.l-4 (2012) (describing what percentage of the states use elections to select
their supreme courts and what form these elections take).
167 See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory
Interpretation, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1215, 1254, 1257 (2012).
168 See Hans A. Linde, Observations of a State Court Judge, in Judges and Legislators:
Toward Institutional Comity 117, 118 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988) ("[B]y dint of prior
political experience as legislators or prosecutors, [many state judges] are quite familiar with
the legislative branch and feel comfortable interacting with it."). By contrast, only one
Supreme Court Justice appointed since the 1950s (Justice O'Connor in 1981) held prior
elected legislative or executive office. See Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin,
The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the
U.S. Supreme Court, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 903, 930-32 (2003). None of the Justices appointed
since 2003 (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch) have
held such elected offices. See Robert Alleman & Jason Mazzone, The Case for Returning
Politicians to the Supreme Court, 61 Hastings L.J. 1353, 1354-56, 1391 (2010).
169 Bruhl & Leib, supra note 167, at 1254.
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statutory stare decisis. Further, state capitals are relatively small and
concentrated environments when compared to Washington, D.C. In
these more intimate surroundings, state judges and legislators interact
more often and understand one another better, which further encourages
judges to acculturate to currently enacted legislative modifications or
revisions.
Presumably for these reasons, elected judges--especially but not
exclusively those chosen via partisan ballot-have been found to be less
willing to adhere to precedent than their appointed counterparts. 170
Moreover, there is evidence that elected judges write more opinions and
get cited less often, suggesting a lighter force of stare decisis. 171
Additionally, state court judges elected to their positions make more
campaign contributions than their appointed counterparts; they also are
more likely to have attended lower-ranked in-state law schools than their
appointed colleagues from other states. 172 Perhaps not surprisingly, some
scholars have concluded that these elected judges "are more like
politicians and less like professionals. 173
What does all this mean for integrating the practice of underwrites
with our varied commitments to stare decisis? Our taxonomy of settings
in which stare decisis is less robust invites consideration of the same
settings as attractive candidates for legislative underwrites. Thus, for
instance, Congress might decide that underwriting a particular Supreme
Court decision is valuable in an area where subsequent changes in the
law have sowed confusion or uncertainty, limiting the impact of
precedent. Our earlier discussion of the ratification of Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. qualifies under this heading: 174 Congress in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 decided to incorporate the disparate impact standard set
170 See Stefanie A. Lindquist, Stare Decisis as Reciprocity Norm, in What's Law Got to
Do with It? What Judges Do, Why They Do It, and What's at Stake 173, 178, 184-85
(Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011) (finding that from 1975 to 2004 partisan-elected state
supreme courts were far more likely to overturn existing precedent than courts selected by
other methods; non-partisan-elected courts were next most likely to overturn precedent,
while appointed state supreme courts were considerably less likely to do so than either group
of elected courts).
171 See Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The
Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L. Econ. &
Org. 290, 326-27 (2010).
172 Id. at 327.
173 Id.
174 See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
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forth in Griggs after the subsequent Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio
decision had cast serious doubt on the operation of that standard.
1 75
Additionally, underwrites may be attractive with respect to decisions
where there has been minimal reliance but strong legislative support.
The underwrite of Barnett Bank of Marion County N.A. v. Nelson in the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 might qualify here. 176 Substantial
reliance on the 1996 precedent was unlikely in such a short period, but
Congress strongly believed that the decision was correct and important
enough to ratify in text.
It may be less obvious to infer that underwrites make sense for
decisions deemed essentially unworkable in coherence terms. Yet
Congress may decide that underwriting a particular decision serves to
prioritize that precedent with the aim of clearing away judicial or agency
flotsam and jetsam pointing in a different direction. 177 When Congress
decides to lock in such a precedent before it is abandoned by the courts,
this constitutes an instance of legislative supremacy appropriately
asserted.'
A solid case can also be made to support underwrites in settings
where stare decisis is weaker for institutional reasons. With respect to
the courts of appeals, Congress might be especially tempted to
underwrite decisions in areas of special circuit expertise, such as
securities statute interpretations from the Second Circuit.'7 9 This
arguably is what took place in Congress's underwrite of the
misappropriation doctrine in the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988.180 Even for the vast majority of appeals court
decisions presumptively unknown to Congress, one or more may be
brought to its attention and become underwrite subjects-perhaps to
175 See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
176 See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
177 This kind of underwrite may be accompanied by explicit disapproval of contrary
judicial authority. See generally supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing overrides
in the 1991 Civil Rights Act that accompanied the underwrite of Griggs).
178 On the other hand, underwriting an antitrust precedent risks stifling the very common
law-type development that Congress contemplated and encouraged in the first instance when
it chose to legislate an economic standard ("restraint of trade") that hinged on evolving
understandings of economics. We consider that counterpoint below. See infra text
accompanying notes 226-27.
179 See supra note 165.
180 See supra text accompanying note 39.
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preempt the Supreme Court from addressing a circuit conflict or simply
to approve a decision in an area of law that has captured Congress's
interest.
Finally, state court decisions may be especially attractive candidates
for underwrites given the softer influence of stare decisis and the close
political and professional relations between courts and legislatures at the
state level. We set forth six examples from four states in Section I.B, but
we are confident that scores of additional instances occur regularly in
state legislatures across the country. At times, a legislature simply
underwrites what it deems one eminently sensible judicial gloss on its
incomplete or ambiguous statutory text.181 On other occasions, a
legislature aggregates and writes into law the distilled holdings from
several decisions addressing the same point of statutory meaning.18 And
occasionally, a state legislature follows an even more extended judicial
trail, approving a state court decision that has expanded the state law
beyond a U.S. Supreme Court precedent.'83
It might seem tempting to conclude that we are framing a linear
theory of complementarity for underwrites: in areas where stare decisis
is weaker, legislative endorsements are especially justified or uniquely
appropriate. We think, however, that such a description would be at once
under- and over-inclusive in that the relationship between stare decisis
and underwrites cannot be so neatly contained.
For one thing, underwrites may well reflect legislative preferences for
reasons unrelated to the strength of stare decisis. A legislature might
wish to embed a relative consensus among lower courts that have
specified the meaning of certain open-ended text. This wish may simply
reflect an emergent or widespread policy agreement among legislators,
irrespective of the number of lower courts that have spoken or the
possible denial of review by the highest court. Alternatively, a
legislature may underwrite from more strategic interbranch motives
when seeking to lock in a high court result that is congenial to a majority
181 See, e.g., supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (discussing 2010 New York
domestic relations law statute); supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text (discussing 2009
New York election law statute); supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (discussing 2009
New Jersey mortgage foreclosure statute).
182 See, e.g., supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text (discussing 2006 Wisconsin
disabilities law revision).
183 See, e.g., supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (discussing 2008 New Jersey law
on burdens of proof).
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of both houses. Legislative approval may be a hedge against shifting
perspectives in an ideologically changing high court or against an effort
by the implementing agency in a new administration to revisit the
judicial result. 184 These examples suggest that underwrites could be seen
as giving rise to "supercharged" precedents in certain circumstances: the
legislature's endorsement precludes deviation by institutional actors
(here, lower courts or the highest court) that otherwise might feel less
constrained.
Other instances that arguably fit into such a "supercharging" model
include underwrites that foreclose the possibility of agency
nonacquiescence or that preclude further development of circuit court
conflicts."8 5 At the same time, the likelihood that underwrites make more
sense where stare decisis is weakest suggests that this may be more of a
levelling-up mechanism than a supercharge. And the risk of labeling
certain forms of underwriting as "supercharged" is a tendency to weaken
the standard voltage associated with stare decisis in general, which
would be unfortunate.
Moreover, failure to underwrite in an area where stare decisis has
relatively less weight ought not give rise to an inference that precedent is
to be ignored or discounted. Despite Justice Kagan's instruction about
common law statutes in Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC,
18 6
Congress's reluctance to underwrite decisions construing common law
statutes like the antitrust laws or the Civil War-era civil rights laws has
hardly resulted in an abandonment of respect for precedent in these
fields.187 More generally, such respect is especially important for
precedent outside the Supreme Court. The same factors that contribute
184 In King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89, 2496 (2015), the Supreme Court ratified
an agency interpretation as "correct" (not simply "reasonable" or "permissible"), thereby
precluding any effort by implementing agencies to revisit the result in the future. Just as a
legislative underwrite precludes judicial revisiting or updating of its own precedent, the
Supreme Court in King precluded agency updating of its own interpretation by invoking a
"major questions" exception to the Chevron deference approach. Id. at 2488-89.
185 See supra Section II.B (discussing these two issues).
186 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2412-13 (2015); see supra text accompanying notes 160-61.
187 See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983) (invoking precedent to determine the
nature of damages recoverable for tort liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 257-59 (1981) (relying on precedent to decide whether
municipalities are immune from punitive damages in a § 1983 lawsuit); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof1
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688-96 (1978) (invoking precedent to apply the Rule
of Reason under § 1 of the Sherman Act).
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to the reduced influence of stare decisis with respect to court of appeals
decisions strongly militate against according meaning to the absence of
underwrites for these decisions. Congress lacks the time and resources to
become aware of them, they are not the final judicial word on a statutory
matter, and they have limited geographic scope.'88
In sum, the rule of law, reliance, and judicial efficiency values that
support statutory stare decisis remain strong. And these values, which
are relevant even in settings where stare decisis has less influence,
counsel against drawing negative inferences from failure to engage in
legislative underwrites. At the same time, the doctrinal and institutional
settings in which stare decisis appropriately carries less weight offer
distinct possibilities for legislatures to underwrite on a more self-
conscious and perhaps more frequent basis.
B. Interplay with the Varied Sounds of Legislative Silence
Courts will need to consider how both the possibility for and ongoing
practice of legislative underwriting should influence their approaches to
the trio of interpretive doctrines parading under the banner of
"legislative acquiescence." Federal courts and state courts 189 often
reason that legislatures agree with their rulings-and thus, that these
rulings should be kept in place or even extended-when legislatures
(1) stay silent after a publicized court opinion,' 90 (2) reenact statutory
provisions without changing them,' 91 or (3) reject proposals for changes
from the status quo established in the courts.192 The modality of
reasoning from legislative silence holds that legislatures probably
188 See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
189 For some state examples of the reenactment rule specifically, see Madrigal v. Indus.
Comm'n, 210 P.2d 967, 971 (Ariz. 1949); Devillers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 702 N.W.2d
539, 568 (Mich. 2005) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting); Rambo v. Lawson, 799 S.W.2d 62, 65
(Mo. 1990) (Robertson, J., concurring in the result). There are occasional legislative
endorsements of the reenactment rule as well. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-2A-20(B)(7)
(West 2014) ("[Tlhe following aids to construction may be considered in ascertaining the
meaning of the text: ... a reenactment of a statute or readoption of a rule that does not
change the pertinent language after a court or agency construed the statute or rule.").
190 See generally 2B Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory
Construction § 49:9 (7th ed. 2012) (discussing legislative inaction after a court decision as
evidence that the legislature agrees with that decision).
191 See generally id. § 49:8 (discussing reenactment of a statute with a previous judicial
gloss as evidence of the interpretation's correctness).
192 See Eskridge, supra note 9, at 69.
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acquiesce to decisions by courts that they are aware of but choose not to
override.193 The reenactment rule holds that when a legislature,
presumptively aware of a judicial interpretation of a statutory provision,
reenacts that statute without changing the provision, it will be deemed to
have endorsed the court decision.1 94 And courts may read a rejected
proposal in legislative history (whether by vote of the full membership
or of an important committee) to be a choice against a particular
interpretation embodied in that proposal.1 95
Because pure silence and rejected proposals do not result in enacted
law, they are of lesser significance in the pantheon of the tools of
statutory interpretation. 196 Indeed, .scholars who have considered the
range of acquiescence doctrines have tended to see the reenactment rule
as standing apart from mere legislative silence or inaction,1 97 which
Justice Scalia has called a "canard." 198 Justice Scalia's impatience with
silence and rejected proposals stemmed from his view that too many
inferences can be drawn from inaction or "the failure to enact
'overruling' legislation, including (1) approval of the status quo;
(2) inability to agree upon how to alter the status quo; (3) unawareness
193 See, e.g., Peter Tiersma, The Language of Silence, 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 89 (1995).
194 See e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 n.4 (1998); Pierce v.
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567 (1988) (declining to apply the reenactment rule due to
unsettled judicial interpretation but acknowledging that reenactment of a statute with
consistent judicial interpretation "generally includes the settled judicial interpretation");
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978).
195 See e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 579-80 (2006); Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S.
614, 622-23 (2004); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975).
196 See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 22 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring)
("There are vast differences between legislating by doing nothing and legislating by positive
enactment, both in the processes by which the will of Congress is derived and stated and in
the clarity and certainty of the expression of its will." (footnote omitted)).
197 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 Calif. L. Rev. 613, 670-71 (1991) (finding
that "[t]he reenactment rule is somewhat less questionable" than reasoning from legislative
silence); Marshall, supra note 146, at 184 n.42 ("The reenactment rule is itself quite
controversial and is subject to some, but not all, of the criticisms that have been directed at
the silent-acquiescence argument."); Tiersma, supra note 193, at 90 ("Because the legislature
has reenacted the statute, it is more likely to be aware of the courts' interpretation, and there
is no doubt that the legislature has had sufficient opportunity to nullify an incorrect
interpretation.").
198 Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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of the status quo; (4) indifference to the status quo; and (5) political
cowardice."1 99 Others have offered similar criticisms. 0°
We need not take a general position here on the wisdom or weight of
these critiques, but we believe that the reenactment rule is probably a
better estimator of legislative intent than its completely silent cousins.
To the extent the cluster of acquiescence canons are rules of evidence to
approximate legislative intent, the reenactment rule, based on a
completed legislative product, is clearer evidence than the others.0 1 This
is not to say the reenactment rule is without its critics, 20 2 but at least it is
legislative action rather than inaction, which draws it closer to the kinds
of active underwriting we explore in this Article.
199 Tiersma, supra note 193, at 91. Professors Hart and Sacks have a list twelve-deep. See
Hart & Sacks, supra note 14, at 1359. It would be useful to have some empirical data
shedding light on Congress's own views about acquiescence doctrines. However, the most
recent and comprehensive study of congressional knowledge and attitudes regarding
interpretive factors such as dictionaries, canons, and legislative history, by Professors Gluck
and Bressman, does not address legislative silence. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 2.
200 See, e.g., Reed Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes 181 (1975);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 537-47 (1983); John C.
Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into
"Speculative Unrealities," 64 B.U. L. Rev. 737, 752-55 (1985); Tiersma, supra note 193, at
92-93. See generally Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-21 (1940) ("To explain the
cause of non-action by Congress when Congress itself sheds no light is to venture into
speculative unrealities .... Various considerations of parliamentary tactics and strategy
might be suggested as reasons for the inaction of the Treasury and of Congress, but they
would only be sufficient to indicate that we walk on quicksand when we try to fid in the
absence of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle.").
201 See Tiersma, supra note 193, at 95-96 ("The inference is therefore stronger if Congress
has reenacted the statute without change, or has rejected a proposed amendment that would
undermine the court's interpretation. Yet because these are merely inferences, and because
competing inferences are also possible, congressional silence communicates nothing, but is
at best an indicator of possible legislative intent."); see also Scalia & Garner, supra note 138,
at 256-60 (more or less endorsing a form of the "reenactment canon" after dismissing
acquiescence inferences from inaction).
202 See, e.g., Robert C. Brown, Regulations, Reenactment, and the Revenue Acts, 54 Harv.
L. Rev. 377, 383 (1941); A.H. Feller, Addendum to the Regulations Problem, 54 Harv. L.
Rev. 1311, 1317-18 (1941); Erwin N. Griswold, A Summary of The Regulations Problem,
54 Harv. L. Rev 398, 400 (1941); Filiberto Agusti, Note, The Effect of Prior Judicial and
Administrative Constructions on Codification of Pre-Existing Federal Statutes: The Case of
the Federal Securities Code, 15 Harv. J. on Legis. 367, 368-69 (1978). To be fair, many
critiques focus on the reenactment rule's effect on administrative interpretations and
regulations rather than on judicial interpretation in particular. See Randolph E. Paul, Use and
Abuse of Tax Regulations in Statutory Construction, 49 Yale L.J. 660, 665 (1940) ("No
person, therefore, could honestly claim that the doctrine of approval by reenactment has any
solid factual foundation.").
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To be sure, the reenactment rule can be used to assume that silence-
a form of inaction-during the reenactment process connotes a sub
silentio approval for all judicial interpretations of the statute that precede
its reenactment.2 3 But this is not the form of the rule that is most
persuasive. Rather, the rule works best-and is most consistently
applied-when the legislature is self-consciously acting in a way that
can reasonably be understood as an endorsement of a preexisting judicial
gloss on a particular statutory provision that is being reenacted.2 °4
Notice that the more self-conscious an endorsement through
reenactment is, the closer that endorsement approaches an underwrite.
But it is important to get clear on the range of reenactments that could
approach an underwrite yet still come shy of it. For example, imagine
that a legislature is planning to amend a policy approach substantially
but wants to leave some basic features of that preexisting policy intact.
Rather than enacting only a series of amendments and trying to figure
out where in the modified statute the revisions belong, it might be more
efficient for a legislature to rewrite the whole statute so it holds together
with more coherence. Although the legislature might not be explicit
about this in the text of the statute or the relevant committee reports, it
might be an obvious assumption of the drafters that the parts that remain
intact from a prior law are meant to be continuous with the legal
decisions made up to the point of the revision.
This example would not qualify as a true underwrite in our terms
because the conditions for the gold standard of underwriting-
elaborated text or simple text accompanied by elaborated agreement in
the relevant committee reports-are not met. But the portions of the
statute that have been effectively reenacted can sometimes fairly be
taken as acquiescence. This is especially true when discussion in the
legislative history tends to imply support for background decisional law
without mentioning names of cases.
203 See Paul, supra note 202, at 666 n.32 ("[T]he reenactment rule.., is based not so much
upon active acquiescence as upon the assumption that the ruling would have come to the
affirmative attention of [the legislature] if it had involved any violent departure from the
spirit of the act." (emphasis omitted)).
204 See Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Rules-Interpretive, Legislative, and
Retroactive, 57 Yale L.J. 919, 941 (1948) ("Whenever [legislative] awareness of the
administrative [or judicial] interpretation does not appear and seems unlikely, the basis for
the reenactment rule vanishes."); Eskridge, supra note 197, at 671 ("[T]he reenactment rule
should not apply if there is no sound reason to believe that [the legislature] was aware of the
Court's decision.").
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It is obviously not always the case that a reenactment can routinely be
taken to imply agreement with background decisional law. Often,
legislatures betray no knowledge or understanding of the complicated
gloss that judges have placed upon statutory language. And legislatures
surely reenact lots of statutory provisions incidentally to modifications,
amendments, and updates without any study of or assumptions about the
case law in place at the time of reenactment. Ultimately, it takes a
sophisticated interpreter to know the difference. But it is not just a
canard to find reenactment to be probative of intent in some set of cases.
This example helps reveal a possible gap in Professors Hart and
Sacks's understanding about the reenactment rule, a point made
helpfully clear now that the potential for underwriting is squarely on the
table. Hart and Sacks tended to resist what they saw as a "rigid"
reenactment rule; they preferred to replace it with something akin to a
clear statement rule, recommending a finding of acquiescence only when
a legislature explicitly seeks to "freeze" the law in place. 20 5 Although
they didn't articulate it, an underwriting is probably the clear statement
they were looking for.
We agree that underwrites are the best evidence of legislative intent
among acquiescence signals. But it is not hard to see that legislatures
sometimes will operate with assumptions of correctness of decisional
law when they undertake efforts to reform aspects of legal regimes. The
reenactment rule can pick up on just those instances when the legislature
is implicitly carrying forward judicial decisions into reenacted statutes.
The "rigidity" Hart and Sacks impute to the reenactment rule may stem
from not fully appreciating that it is only a rule of evidence rather than a
dispositive decisional rule.
Hart and Sacks also seem to have exaggerated the likely effect of an
acquiescence found to follow from reenactment, which may be part of
why they wanted an explicit underwrite to do the work of proving that
the legislature agrees with a court decision. Specifically, Hart and Sacks
imagined that the doctrinal effect of reenactment was to "freeze the
statute in exactly the way it has been applied" and for the statute's body
of law "to lose its capacity for continued growth. 20 6 But it strikes us that
205 See Hart & Sacks, supra note 14, at 1366-68; see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 20, 37 n.79 (1988) (discussing the Hart
and Sacks approach to reenactment).
206 Hart & Sacks, supra note 14, at 1368.
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this is overreading a reenactment-and indeed would overread an
underwrite, as well. An acquiescence or endorsement should not
reasonably be construed as a "freeze" or as a prohibition on "continued
growth." Rather, a reliably expressed underwrite or acquiescence-by-
reenactment is primarily a clear instruction not to backslide. It also
might permit the approved decision to be utilized in further development
of judicial common law decision making, at least in the immediate area
and sometimes even in cognate areas, as we discussed in Subsection
II.C.6. 20 7 Although we concluded there that negative inferences from the
failure to underwrite should not be legally relevant, nothing requires an
underwrite to "freeze" law, nor must an underwrite be so constrained.
When a legislature gives a court a "Hear!, Hear!," it very well may be
signaling that the underwritten decision can be further developed in
traditional common law form and may even be portable to related
statutes. 208 Once this is clarified, someone generally sympathetic to Hart
and Sacks might both acknowledge the usefulness of underwrites and
admit that reenactments can be a useful signal to the judiciary not to
backslide in an area of decisional law interpreting a statute that has been
changed in several respects.
In summary, as judges think about integrating underwrite practices
into statutory interpretation, they should be able to see more clearly the
distinction between legislatures' active engagement with judicial
decisions of the past and the distinctly less probative passive
incorporation that inaction can occasionally signal. Judges also should
be able to distinguish more readily between an outright endorsement
through underwrites and the lesser support for acquiescence supplied by
reenactments. But in both of these latter cases, the upshot is not that the
state of law "freezes." Indeed, endorsement through underwrites might
very well support further growth, reinforcing reliance by establishing
that no backsliding is warranted while also giving a boost to the
principles and reasoning in the endorsed cases. On this basis, the
underwritten decisions can be further implemented in the newly enacted
law and whatever relevant related laws make sense.
207 See supra text accompanying notes 137-42.
208 As we argued in Subsection II.C.6, although we did not embrace Professor Widiss's
view that overrides should be presumptively portable to related statutes, we explained that
the inquiry into whether an underwrite should be "contagious" is very context-specific.
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C. Wherefore More Underwrites?
We hope to have convinced legislators, judges, and scholars that they
should be paying more attention to underwrite practices and that
underwrites are, on balance, healthy for the enterprise of statutory
interpretation. We next briefly address several special contexts. Some
would probably benefit from more underwriting, while others would not.
Consider King v. Burwell, °9 a famous case from the Supreme Court's
2015 docket. Plaintiffs there sought to invalidate a Department of
Treasury regulation that awarded tax credits under the Affordable Care
Ace' to participants in health exchanges that were established by the
federal government.21' The authorizing legislation that Treasury was
purporting to interpret, however, required that the credits be awarded to
participants in "an Exchange established by the State, 212 where "the
State" as conventionally understood probably did not include the federal
211government. Challengers were ultimately unsuccessful in overturning
the Treasury regulation, but not because the Court granted deference to
the executive agency.214 Rather, the Court decided that "the context and
structure of the [Affordable Care] Act compel us to depart from what
would otherwise be the most natural reading of the pertinent statutory
phrase" to "allow[] tax credits for insurance purchased on any Exchange
created under the Act," including federal exchanges. 2' Leaving aside the
political hurdles, should a responsible Congress underwrite this decision
by amending the Internal Revenue Code to read "an Exchange
established by the State or federal government" or "an Exchange
established by this Act" consistent with the holding in King?
This query raises the question of whether underwrites might be
particularly useful in cases of drafting error. Although King was not
209 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
210 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119.
211 Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377, 30,378 (May 23, 2012)
(codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 602) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 155.20).
212 I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
213 See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (invoking a definition in the
Affordable Care Act that "' State' means 'each of the 50 States and the District of
Columbia"' (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 18024(d) (2012))).
214 See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, The Rise and Fall of Chevron in Tax: From the Early Days
to King and Beyond, 2015 Pepp. L. Rev. 19, 26.
215 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495-96.
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generally treated as a formal "scrivener's error" case,216 it might be
viewed as an instance of "staffer's error"217 or even simply a case where
the legislative intent was not properly transcribed into the plain language
of the statute. It is reasonable to ask whether underwrites might be
especially helpful in sticky cases where courts struggle between
applying the plain meaning of a statute that seems counterintuitive with
a potentially perverse result, and attempting to approximate common
sense about what the legislature most probably intended.
Our view is that the cleanup work for drafting errors does not seem
like a very pressing category for more legislative underwriting. Such
cases, especially ones that reach the highest court in high-profile
litigation, are likely to survive on account of the force of stare decisis.
Moreover, these cases-involving stark tension between seemingly plain
text and putative intent-are the most likely candidates for overriding if
the highest court gets it "wrong.21 8
Admittedly, legislatures might consider underwriting at an earlier
stage of the litigation, when the intermediate courts of appeals have
spoken on the issue of a drafting error. If legislators observe that
different jurisdictions are expending a lot of resources on resolving a
drafting problem, a legislative intervention to underwrite or fix the
statute before more judicial resources are consumed on the error seems
productive. This may, in fact, be the best explanation for what happened
with the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005219: the statute had included a
provision that seemingly accidentally created a waiting period to file a
216 See generally Ryan D. Doerfler, The Scrivener's Error, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 811 (2016)
(arguing that the Affordable Care Act contained a scrivener's error).
217 See Jesse M. Cross, Statutory Text in the Era of the CEO Legislator: Lessons on
Congressional Managing 45 (Aug. 12, 2015) (unpublished manuscript)
http://ssm.com/abstract-264299 1.
218 See Eskridge, supra note 5, at 347-48 (concluding that Congress is more likely to
override "'plain meaning' decisions" than any others; nearly half the overrides from 1967 to
1990 address plain meaning or canons reasoning, whereas overrides of decisions based on
legislative purpose are rare); see also Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism's Failures: A Study of
Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 887, 903-10 (2000) (finding that
textualist decisions construing the federal Bankruptcy Code are more likely to be overridden
than other bankruptcy decisions between 1978 and 1998).
219 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C. (2012)).
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certain kind of appeal rather than a time limit.220 The relevant legislative
history discussed this provision as a seven-day deadline, 221 but the plain
meaning of the statute clearly created a seven-day waiting period.
Intermediate courts of appeals opted to favor legislative intent over plain
meaning, although not without spirited debate.222 Congress then
intervened to fix the statute before the Supreme Court addressed the
brewing controversy. 23 Had the Supreme Court taken up the matter
more quickly, Congress probably would not have needed to act. But
because the lower courts were expending time and energy on the
problem, it made sense for Congress to fix the error. While it did not
technically underwrite one of the lower courts by pointing to its
reasoning, Congress could have efficiently done so, as it was self-
consciously fixing its own prior scrivener's error. Even here, though, the
argument for an underwrite rather than simply fixing the error is not
terribly strong.
22028 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (2006) (authorizing discretionary appeals of district court
decisions about removal "if application is made to the court of appeals not less than 7 days
after entry of the order").
221 See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 49 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 46 ("New
subsection 1453(c) provides discretionary appellate review of remand orders under this
legislation but also imposes time limits. Specifically, parties must file a notice of appeal
within seven days after entry of a remand order.").
222 Six circuits treated the text as a deadline rather than a waiting period, bypassing its
plain language. See Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 2006);
Morgan v. Gay, 466 F.3d 276, 277 (3d Cir. 2006); Patterson v. Dean Morris, L.L.P., 444
F.3d 365, 368 n.1 (5th Cir. 2006); Natale v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 06-8011, 2006 WL
1458585, at *1 (7th Cir. May 8, 2006); Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw
Transit Servs., 435 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2006); Pritchett v. Office Depot, 420 F.3d
1090, 1093 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005). This corrective position, however, sparked some judicial
controversy. See Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., 448
F.3d 1092, 1093 (9th Cir. 2006) (order denying rehearing en banc); id. at 1094, 1095 (Bybee,
J., dissenting, joined by five other judges) ("The Republic will certainly survive this modest,
but dramatic emendation of the United States Code; I am not so sanguine that in the long
term it can stand this kind of abuse of our judicial power."); id. at 1099-100 ("'[R]escuing'
Congress from what the panel assumes was a mistake forces both the legislative and judicial
branches to deviate from their respective constitutional roles."); Spivey v. Vertrue, Inc., 528
F.3d 982, 983-85 (7th Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, J.) (applying the plain language as written).
For more on the debate, see generally Adam N. Steinman, "Less" Is "More"? Textualism,
Intentionalism, and a Better Solution to the Class Action Fairness Act's Appellate Deadline
Riddle, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 1183 (2007) (proposing that courts could resolve this controversy
by simply recognizing that the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide a thirty-day
deadline to file an appeal).
223 See Statutory Time-Periods Technical Amendments Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-16,
§ 6(2), 123 Stat. 1607, 1608.
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There are also potential risks associated with underwrites in drafting
error cases where a court, like the Supreme Court in King, has arguably
misconstrued plain meaning. If a legislature attempts to underwrite and
is unsuccessful-for reasons related to time pressures, substantive
disagreement, or politics-it is possible that the mere effort to
underwrite will weaken the effect of stare decisis. While such risks are
always present regarding inferences from rejected proposals,224 the
stakes are higher in a drafting error context, where reliance values are
especially weighty. These are controversies in which it is usually better
that statutory meaning be settled because the text reads
counterintuitively, and private parties need to rely on the relevant
precedent. Indeed, in King, part of the reason the Court chose not to use
traditional agency-deference doctrine to sustain the Treasury regulation,
but rather invoked its own interpretation of the statute, could have been
224 There may even be risks from failure to offer underwrite proposals, as evidenced by the
disagreement between the majority and dissent in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461
U.S. 574 (1983). The majority, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, upheld as correct a
1970 IRS interpretation of the charitable tax exemption provision of the Internal Revenue
Code, see I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982), which had denied tax-exempt status to private schools
that practiced racial discrimination. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 595. The Chief Justice concluded
that Congress had essentially underwritten this 1970 agency ruling, based on the text and
legislative history of its 1976 revision of the Revenue Code. The 1976 text, see I.R.C.
§ 501(i), denied tax-exempt status to social clubs whose charters or policy statements
discriminated on the basis of race. The accompanying House and Senate Committee Reports
referred to the Court's earlier summary affirmance of a lower court decision embracing the
1970 IRS position on § 501(c)(3) as having established that "discrimination on account of
race is inconsistent with an educational institution's tax exempt status." Bob Jones, 461 U.S.
at 601 (emphasis added by Court) (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1318, at 7-8 & n.5 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6051, 6057-58 & n.5; H.R. Rep. No. 94-1353, at 8 & n.5
(1976)). In dissent, Justice Rehnquist drew a contrary inference from the 1976 legislation:
Congress in § 501(i) showed that "when it wants to add a requirement prohibiting racial
discrimination to one of the tax-benefit provisions, it is fully aware of how to do it," yet
Congress did no such thing for § 501(c)(3). Id. at 621 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The disagreement in Bob Jones-involving an agency's initial interpretation of text,
adopted by a lower court and then endorsed without opinion by the Supreme Court, with
congressional approval expressed through legislative history-takes us some distance from
our prototypical underwriting settings. That said, and given that Congress in 1976 was
extending the IRS-approved position against racial discrimination to a new field of private
action (written discriminatory policies in noneducational social settings), we are skeptical
about Justice Rehnquist's effort to infer meaning from Congress's failure to propose a
§ 501(c)(3) textual underwrite when it had done so in deliberative terms through both House
and Senate reports. Had Congress attempted unsuccessfully to underwrite § 501(c)(3) in text
when enacting § 501(i), the lack of success would present a closer question, requiring deeper
consideration of the legislative context.
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to disable backsliding in this important area of societal reliance. Had the
Court chosen to sustain the regulation through deference, a future
administration would be free to read the statute another way.225 Although
we have made a point to emphasize that negative inference from failures
to underwrite should have no legal significance, we obviously cannot
wholly control what courts and lawyers will do with this analytical
category of legislative action now that we have helped make it clear that
underwrites occur with some frequency.
Another area that does not call out for more underwrites might
involve so-called "common law statutes," where legislatures put into
place very broadly worded laws that they expect courts to develop
themselves over time.226 Examples in the states may be the local
versions of the Uniform Commercial Code. In federal law we might
count the antitrust statutes, where it makes sense to have relatively weak
stare decisis as a general matter so that courts can adapt the application
of the law to modem economic and competitive conditions without
routine updates from the legislature.227 Although we suggested above in
Section III.A that areas of weak stare decisis for institutional reasons
could be strong candidates for more routine underwrites, in the realm of
"common law statutes" there is weak stare decisis by legislative design.
Accordingly, legislatures should generally allow the common law to
develop freely with only episodic interventions.
What legislative areas, then, might invite more frequent
underwrites? 2 28 In criminal law, notice to potential defendants is of
special concern, helping to structure the rules of statutory interpretation
in this field.229 Adding more precise signals of approval in our criminal
225 The law of interpretive deference to administrative agencies permits agencies to change
their views within a permissible range of interpretations of a statute. See Chevron, U.S.A. v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984). A later case, National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass 'n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005), makes
clear that lower court decisions about the meaning of an ambiguous statute generally do not
bind the agency over time.
226 For discussion, see Ethan J. Leib & Michael Scrota, The Costs of Consensus in
Statutory Construction, 120 Yale L.J. Online 47, 53-54 (2010).
227 See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
228 In Section III.A, we suggested a few areas where encouraging underwriting would be
salutary because stare decisis is weaker for institutional reasons: appeals court decisions in
areas of special circuit expertise and state court decisions.
229 See, e.g., Leib & Serota, supra note 226, at 54-55 (discussing the rule of lenity and the
special concern of notice within the statutory interpretation regime as applied to criminal
law).
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law codes seems to comport with such particularized notice
considerations, especially when recognizing that Supreme Court
interpretations of inconclusive criminal law text often yields overrides
rather than underwrites. 230 Given that the criminal law is an area of
substantial interbranch disagreement, more frequent underwriting could
help relieve uncertainty and tension in this area.
Finally, to return to the theme of the previous Section on the
reenactment rule, there are good reasons to think that more frequent
underwrites would be valuable in legislative domains where reenactment
is common. As we discussed earlier, the implications from reenactment
probably give us only modest information about acquiescence.231
Accordingly, more explicit underwrites could be useful in the ongoing
development of law. Tax laws and appropriations laws that tend to be
the source of routine reenactment by legislatures seem especially useful
areas to be clear about acquiescence, so that courts are not regularly
trying to read tea leaves through legislative silence. Put differently, in
legislative domains that are regularly revisited, usually reflecting a
working bipartisan coalition to update and clarify the law, underwrites
would seem most productive. This instinct is supported by a study of the
tax area, where underwrites seem rather common. 32 By contrast, when
legislatures take to reforming a statutory scheme only episodically, a
reenactment after legislative study can be more plausibly taken as a
reasonably reliable signal for courts to stay the course and hence
underwrites seem less necessary.
D. Bringing Underwrites to Light
There are better and worse options for making underwrites more
systematically visible, keeping in mind some of the benefits and costs
we described above. Consider first a new standing conference committee
in a legislature, composed of elected members of the lower and upper
houses, modeled on the International Law Commission ("ILC"), an
230 See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1361 ("[A]ltogether criminal law,
criminal procedure, and habeas corpus rules account for almost 13% of the total overrides,
making the combined category among the largest producers of overrides.").
231 See supra Section II.B.
232 See generally Staudt et al., supra note 10, at 1342 (describing Congress's tendency to
codify case outcomes). But see Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987)
(arguing that given Congress's appetite for routine updates and overrides of civil rights
statutes, legislative silence is probative).
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elected body of the General Assembly of the United Nations.233 The ILC
is involved in codification processes for international law, reading
international adjudicatory bodies' decisions and-ALl Restatement-
like-putting customary common law into a codified form on an annual
basis. The rest of the General Assembly has an opportunity to adopt ILC
reports and codifications, and these efforts can have continuing legal
force in future litigations. Although the dynamic is quite different on the
international law stage, of course, it would be worth considering
building an ILC-like body within a governing legislature. Such a body
would be tasked with overseeing statutory decisions made within the
courts, reporting back to the full membership annually, seeking to
underwrite in a more regular fashion case law that gets it right in order
to reinforce clarity and encourage reliance. At the very least, such a
body could usefully publicize the underwrites that the legislature has
already promulgated as part of its regular work product, thereby
increasing the chances that courts will pay attention prospectively. This
process could also help LexisNexis and Westlaw flag certain cases
green, just as they try to red-flag cases that have been overruled by
judicial authority-and as they try to do (mostly imperfectly) when a
case is overridden by statute.234
One could also build off of Chief Judge Robert Katzmann's
innovative "statutory housekeeping" project.23 5 The project was piloted
in the D.C. Circuit in 1992 and was designed as a federal "transmission
belt,, 23 6 directing statutory interpretation decisions about poorly drafted
233 See generally Fernando Lusa Bordin, Reflections of Customary International Law: The
Authority of Codification Conventions and ILC Draft Articles in International Law, 63 Int'l
& Comp. L.Q. 535 (2014) (discussing the work and impact of the ILC). Thanks to Professor
Julian Arato for the lead.
234 See generally Brian J. Broughman & Deborah A. Widiss, After the Override: An
Empirical Analysis of Shadow Precedent, 46 J. Legal Stud. 1, 2 (2017) (highlighting that
LexisNexis and Westlaw do a good job of red-flagging cases that are overruled by cases but
a less good job of red-flagging cases overridden by statute).
235 See Robert A. Katzmann & Russell R. Wheeler, A Mechanism for "Statutory
Housekeeping": Appellate Courts Working with Congress, 9 J. App. Prac. & Process 131,
133 (2007); Jeff Simard, Note, Stimulating Dialogue Between the Courts and Congress:
Sprucing Up the "Statutory Housekeeping" Project, 99 Minn. L. Rev. 1195, 1199-204
(2015).
236 Robert A. Katzmann & Stephanie M. Herseth, An Experiment in Statutory
Communication Between Courts and Congress: A Progress Report, 85 Geo. L.J. 2189, 2193
(1997). Judge Katzmann began the project while with the Brookings Institution in
Washington, D.C., prior to his appointment to the Second Circuit. Id. at 2189.
1556 [Vol. 103:1487
Legislative Underwrites
statutes to various offices in the legislature. The aim was for these
offices to receive and review copies of decisions of the U.S. Court of
Appeals, identifying federal statutes that had drafting errors, gaps, and
ambiguities with the hope of reengaging judicial-legislative dialogue.237
The courts do not offer policy recommendations; they only "speak"
through their public opinions, although the submission itself is an effort
to affect the legislative agenda.238 The project still exists after twenty-
five years, and many more circuits now participate. But the procedures
are fairly low salience and have not led to substantial revisions of
statutes by Congress to fix the mistakes the courts are flagging. 23 9 Still,
the Office of Legislative Counsel views the project as a success because,
as the entity most responsible for drafting, it is appreciative of the
opportunity to learn from prior drafting errors observed by the courts.24 0
One shortcoming of the "statutory housekeeping" project is that the
transmission belt goes only one way. That is, little comes back from the
legislators to keep the "dialogue" open. It is perfectly reasonable to
imagine that legislatures often do not respond to the inputs they get
because they are satisfied with the judicial resolution. More express
underwriting through an organized transmission belt, however, would be
a helpful means of letting courts know they are doing an acceptable job.
Rather than inducing such satisfaction from mere silence, Legislative
Counsel could be tasked with a more substantial effort to ensure that the
opinions submitted actually get addressed through self-conscious
underwriting. 24' This project could also be reinforced and expanded to
the Supreme Court and the states (it now is only a transmission belt from
the Courts of Appeals in the federal system) through statute rather than
voluntary participation to increase publicity, transparency, and use.242
A third option would be to promote some form of "judicial impact
statements" in the legislative process to encourage clearer and more
237 Simard, supra note 235, at 1200-01.
238 Id. at 1195.
239 Id. at 1205-09, 1214-17.
240 See id. at 1216.
241 Jeff Simard proposes something like this "second transmission system." Id. at 1225.
242 Simard also proposes moving from the "project" to a statutory system, though he does
not consider that the Supreme Court might also utilize this mechanism to get underwritings.
Id. at 1226-27.
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frequent underwritings.243 A possible template for this kind of exercise is
"Constitutional Authority Statements." House rules in the U.S. Congress
currently require that all bills must be accompanied by a Constitutional
Authority Statement.244 Although the details of this process have been
subject to critical analysis, 245 one might adapt some version of the rule to
ensure that lawmakers' work product self-consciously interacts with
statutory decisions made in the courts. Admittedly, federal courts have
not been especially receptive to Congress's assertions about its own
constitutional authority. That said, there is a more deeply rooted
tradition of courts listening to legislatures about the meaning of statutory
work product in contradistinction to legislative opining on the reach of
its own constitutional powers. The judicial impact statement could be
enacted as law, or it could be included in both chambers' committee
reports, effectuating clear underwrites.
An alternative template for the "judicial impact statement" might be
for an office like the Congressional Research Service ("CRS") to
develop a list of cases that it expects to be underwritten (or overridden)
by a particular bill. CRS tends to be the office in Congress that
systematically tracks developments in the judiciary, and it could be
tasked with presenting to legislators clear judicial effects any given bill
might have. It could also keep itself apprised of statutory decisions that
might benefit from underwriting on a more regular and independent
basis, reporting back to the legislature.2 46 These efforts by CRS would
pay dividends to the legal research community too, which, along with
courts, often struggles simply to find overrides and underwrites, let
alone to understand their implications throughout the corpus juris.
243 We are grateful to Jesse Cross for laying out for us in some depth what this could look
like.
244House Rule XII, 7(c)(1) (l14th Cong.) ("A bill or joint resolution may not be
introduced unless the sponsor submits for printing in the Congressional Record a statement
citing as specifically as practicable the power or powers granted to Congress in the
Constitution to enact the bill or joint resolution.").
245 See Russ Feingold, The Obligation of Members of Congress to Consider
Constitutionality While Deliberating and Voting: The Deficiencies of House Rule XII and a
Proposed Rule for the Senate, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 837, 841-45 (2014); Hanah Metchis Volokh,
Constitutional Authority Statements in Congress, 65 Fla. L. Rev. 173, 182-83 (2013).
246 On CRS, see Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1445-47.
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CONCLUSION
Irrespective of whether it is sound to search for mechanisms that
might further proliferate or entrench the practice of underwriting, we
believe the practice itself is far more common than has been previously
recognized. We also are persuaded that it is a practice worth making
more salient, so that it may become appropriately integrated within the
field of statutory interpretation.
In order for this to happen, lawyers, legislators, judges, and scholars
should pay closer attention to the reality that legislative-judicial
interactions are not inevitably or perhaps even usually oppositional.
Such exchange can take forms that are essentially supportive or mutually
reinforcing, although these forms need to be better understood. Further,
paying careful attention to the doctrinal consequences of legislative
underwrites casts new light on several foundational canons of statutory
interpretation.
We also recognize that consideration of underwrites tends to call for
an intensely contextualized approach in large part because of variable
incentives and disincentives for underwriting. Like overrides, stare
decisis, and legislative acquiescence, the theory and practice of
legislative underwrites is rich with nuance and will repay further
analytic examination. We look forward to future studies of this
interesting and important phenomenon.
2017] 1559

